NATO-based nuclear weapons are an advantage in a dangerous world
Brent Scowcroft was national security advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. Stephen J. Hadley was national security adviser to President George W. Bush. Franklin Miller was responsible for U.S. nuclear policy in the Defense Department for Presidents George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton and on the National Security Council staff for President George W. Bush.
Brent Scowcroft was national security advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush. Stephen J. Hadley was national security adviser to President George W. Bush. Franklin Miller was responsible for U.S. nuclear policy in the Defense Department for Presidents George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton and on the National Security Council staff for President George W. Bush.
When NATO’s leaders gather in Wales in early
September, they will address several issues critical to the alliance,
including Russian adventurism in Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern
Europe, members’ contribution to collective defense, the adequacy of
individual national defense budgets and plans for supporting the people
of Afghanistan. In the course of their deliberations on these issues,
however, they also should reaffirm the value to the alliance of the
continued presence of the modest number of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe.
We believe this is necessary because we are again hearing calls for the
United States to unilaterally withdraw its small arsenal of forward-
deployed nuclear bombs. Those arguments are shopworn, familiar — and
wrong.
The most common argument is that because the United States’ strategic forces have global capabilities, the NATO-based weapons “have no military value.” While that claim is false (NATO’s supreme allied commander recently attested to the weapons’ military utility), it also ignores the most central feature of nuclear weapons: They are, fundamentally, political weapons.
A principal function of forward deployment has been, and remains, to be
a visible symbol to friend and potential foe of the U.S. commitment to
defend NATO with all of the military power it possesses.
The newer members joined NATO in large part to
get under this nuclear umbrella, and they have been vocal in expressing
their concern that withdrawing the weapons would symbolize a diminution
in the U.S. commitment to defend them. Their
concerns are heightened as they watch a recidivist Russia conduct
exercises simulating nuclear strikes on Poland and the Baltic
states, threatening nuclear strikes on nascent NATO missile-defense
sites and continuing to deploy a bloated arsenal of several thousand
short-range nuclear weapons.
A second argument is that because nuclear
weapons have no place in international relations in the 21st century,
they certainly shouldn’t be forward deployed in NATO Europe. In his
much-heralded 2009 Prague speech, President Obama called on the nuclear
states to reduce the role such weapons played in their respective
security strategies, and he took steps to implement his vision in the
United States. Apart from Britain, no other nuclear weapons state took heed;
indeed, the others expanded their nuclear modernization programs and
gave nuclear weapons a more central role. Of particular concern to NATO,
Russia
has embarked on an across-the-board modernization of its nuclear forces,
a modernization judged so important by Moscow that it has
violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in the
process. As our NATO allies point out, nuclear weapons clearly matter to
Russian leadership, and, as a result, our allies insist that the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO cannot be called into question.
A third argument is that NATO, in the aggregate, enjoys
overwhelming conventional military superiority. This argument, however,
is built on two fundamental fallacies. First, such aggregate comparisons
mask the reality that on NATO’s eastern borders, on a regular basis,
Russian forces are numerically superior to those of the alliance. As
events in Crimea and Ukraine showed, Russia’s armed forces have improved
significantly since their poor performance in Georgia in
2008; demonstrating impressive operational capabilities, they have made
clear they are no longer the rag-tag army of the past decade. Second,
focusing on conventional war-fighting capabilities overlooks the fact
that NATO’s principal goal is deterring aggression rather than having to
defeat it. And it is here that NATO’s nuclear capabilities provide
their greatest value.
Finally, we are told that there are deep
divisions within NATO on keeping nuclear weapons forward deployed. It is
true that in 2007 and 2008, domestic politics in several alliance
states fostered such a debate. It should be no surprise that in an
alliance of 28 democratically elected governments such differences will
develop. But by the Lisbon summit of November 2010, those differences
had been resolved, and the Strategic Concept , endorsed by all 28 NATO heads of government, stated: “We
will maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces
[and] ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective
defense planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear
forces, and in command, control, and communications arrangements.” Two years later, in Chicago, all leaders issued the “Deterrence and Defense Policy Review,” which said: “Nuclear
weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for
deterrence and defense alongside conventional and missile defense.”
With Russia continuing to support forces that
are seeking to destabilize Ukraine and taking unsettling actions in both
the Baltics and the Balkans, this is no time to destabilize the NATO alliance and traumatize our NATO allies by withdrawing our nuclear weapons from Europe.
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