U.S. Nuclear Policy: A Matter For The Next President
By Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
After years now of bipartisan consensus to fully invest in the triad,
bipartisan consensus to move forward with the LRSO and GBSD, after the
Obama administration maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity in the
Nuclear Posture Review, and when the U.S. Senate is definitely opposed
to a test ban treaty, the Obama administration should throw in the towel. It has done enough damage and the clock has all but run out. Any
decisions about the country’s nuclear deterrent should belong with the
next President. On this, both parties in Congress should agree.
The nuclear idealists in the Obama
administration only have a few months left to weaken the U.S. nuclear
deterrent by way of implementing a few more items on its “Prague
Agenda.” A new report at the
Washington Post by Josh Rogin reveals that the Obama administration will
seek a United Nations Security Council resolution banning nuclear
testing as a way to bypass the U.S. Senate, which has long opposed
committing the United States to a ban and precluding the option to
resume testing should the reliability and credibility of the force
require it. Avoiding the Senate to commit the United States to a ban,
much like it avoided the Senate to secure the Iran deal, would be an
egregious executive overreach and would go against the statements of
intent from senior Obama administration officials.
For instance, undersecretary of state
Rose Gottemoeller said, “Ratification of the CTBT will require debate,
discussion, questions, briefings, trips to the National Labs and
other technical facilities, hearings and more, as was the case with the
New START Treaty…The Senators should have every opportunity to ask
questions — many, many questions — until they are satisfied. That is how
good policy is made and that is how treaties get across the finish
line.”
She’s exactly right.
In
addition to seeking a testing ban, the administration could also seek
to undo decades-old U.S. nuclear policy. It could change the current
U.S. nuclear policy from that of strategic ambiguity to an official “no
first use” policy. The last NPR maintained strategic ambiguity. Dr. Keith Payne at the National Institute of Public Policy (NIPP) succinctly explains why the existing policy offers a more effective deterrent.
The fatal flaw of the warm and
progressive-sounding NFU proposal is that it tells would-be aggressors
that they do not have to fear US nuclear retaliation even if they attack
us or our allies with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or
biological weapons. They would risk US nuclear retaliation only if they
attack with nuclear weapons. As long as they use non-nuclear forces, a
US NFU policy would provide aggressors with a free pass to avoid the
risk now posed by the US nuclear deterrent.
The administration could also drag its
heels on getting two critical modernization programs successfully
moving through the development and acquisition processes. But doing
this, like circumventing the Senate for a testing ban, would directly
contradict his senior State Department and Pentagon officials and flout
strong-bipartisan support of both programs.
Undersecretary Rose Goettemoeller gave a home-run testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (the entire thing is worth a look),
in which she should have finally put to rest the misguided belief that
the new cruise missile will spur an arms race with Russia. She said “The
Russians have already developed their next-generation nuclear-armed
air-launched cruise missile, the KH-102, and have employed its
conventional variant, the KH-101, in Syria. Any notion that LRSO is spurring on Russia’s advanced cruise missile development is simply not borne out by the facts.”
After this testimony it seemed clear that the United States was moving forward with the LRSO.
Keeping GBSD on time is especially
critical for ensuring the land-based leg of the triad is ready and
reliable. Minuteman III was fielded in the 1970s with a lifespan of 10
years. More than 30 years later, there are now evident capability gaps.
Its unique and complementary characteristics make it the backbone of the
triad. It is daily “in use” by providing the country a 24 hour, 365-day
deterrent. It offers the Commander in Chief an immediate response
option and it promises a devastating response to any enemy that might
wrongly determine attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon is
worth the cost. And if the United States maintains high quantities of
ICBMs, it changes the calculus in the minds of a nuclear aggressor. It
is impervious against air defense systems and cannot ultimately be
destroyed by rogue states. In other words, it would take a massive
nuclear attack to eliminate the land-based leg, the only way to defeat
the ICBM force is a direct nuclear attack on the US homeland. This
raises the stakes and serves as a powerful deterrent to would-be
attackers. Although not cheap, it is a comparative bargain and the most
cost-effective leg of the triad.
Still, although the State Department
testimony and Air Force announcement are encouraging, there are many
steps along the acquisitions process and if the Obama administration
isn’t truly committed to seeing those programs succeed, it could drag
its heels. And since the Obama administration has shown a willingness to
go back on its policy commitments and go against statements of its own
officials, it could derail those programs surreptitiously.
