Iran Continues To Build ICBMs

Iran’s Deadly Missiles Aren’t Up for Negotiation

Talks on the ballistic missile program are a dead end.

Robert Andrea

June 15, 2016

In March of this year, Iran conducted tests of two variants of the Qadr medium-range ballistic missile. Shortly afterwards, a group of GOP senators introduced new sanctions legislation which included provisions sanctioning persons and entities involved with Iran’s ballistic missile program.

Sound familiar?

For decades, the most contentious issue between Iran and the United States was the former’s nuclear program. Following the signing and implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this has changed. To be sure, the nuclear deal itself still generates quite a debate, but Iran’s actual nuclear program has fallen out of the world’s attention.

Nature abhors a vacuum. It was only a matter of time before another issue took the place of the nuclear issue as the most intransigent point of contention between the U.S. and Iran. It would appear, from all indications, that Tehran’s ballistic-missile program will soon assume that dubious position.
Indeed, the missile issue seems to be picking up right where the nuclear one left off. Instead of repeating the same counterproductive diplomatic strategy, however, it’s time we learned from the past. It would be a similar mistake to approach Iran’s ballistic-missile program with the same political and diplomatic myopia that characterized both sides’ approach to the nuclear issue for decades. In fact, Iran’s missiles should not even be on the agenda at this point in time or, at the very least, they should not be an immediate diplomatic priority. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, despite rhetoric to the contrary, Tehran’s missile program is not a serious threat; none of the missiles currently in Iran’s arsenal could reach the United States. And without developing longer-range ICBMs, which would take many years, the U.S. will never be seriously threatened by an Iranian missile program.

However, many of our regional partners—namely Israel—do find themselves within range of the missiles most recently tested by the Iranians. According to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, (which runs Iran’s missile program) the Qadr-H variant has a range of 1,700 kilometers and the Qadr-F variant has a two-thousand-kilometer range. If you are inclined to believe these figures, Israel is now within range of the missiles, as Revolutionary Guards commander Mohammad Ali Jaafari has claimed. But merely being within range of the missiles does not necessarily mean that they are a threat, or at least not a serious threat.

Speaking to this point, Mike Elleman, a Consulting Senior Fellow for Missile Defense with the International Institute of Strategic Studies, gave testimony at a recent hearing on Iran’s ballistic missile program before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. In his testimony, Elleman explained that despite their range, Iran’s missiles are fairly inaccurate. Therefore, if Iran wanted to seriously damage a target—particularly a hardened military target— they would need to utilize a sizeable percentage of their arsenal against just one target to do so. Furthermore, as Elleman stated in his testimony, missile-defense systems would further limit the overall efficacy of Iran’s missiles. An example of such a system would be Israel’s Hetz (Arrow) program, which was developed in collaboration with the United States. The inaccuracy of Iran’s weapons is a weakness that significantly lessens the strategic threat Tehran’s ballistic-missile program poses, even to those regional states that find themselves within range of the missiles.

In addition to the risk that Iran’s ballistic-missile program poses being exaggerated, the current political situation, particularly inside Iran, is not conducive to negotiations on this issue.
First of all, the missile program is quite the touchy subject in Iranian domestic politics. Perhaps the best example of this was the to-do between Ayatollahs Khamenei and Rafsanjani. In an incident that showed that not even high-ranking Iranian Ayatollahs are immune from twenty-first-century public-relations minefields, Rafsanjani came under fire from Khamenei for a tweet the former posted in late March (roughly two weeks after the missile tests) saying that “the world of tomorrow is the world of discourse, not missiles”. In a speech soon after, Khamenei said in response to Rafsanjani that individuals who used such a phrase knowingly were “treasonous.” Rafsanjani was quick to correct his tweet, but not before enduring significant backlash from his harder-line opponents.

Whether or not the Iranian assessment of the post-deal situation is accurate is a fairly irrelevant question, however. Whatever their assessment, the fact is that the Iranian perception of the United States’ willingness (or a lack thereof) to follow through with a negotiated agreement would very likely lead them to harden their positions on the missile issue.
Not to be outdone, the American position is likely to harden as well with the new administration next January. Whichever of the two candidates is elected, it’s fairly safe to make the assumption that the American line towards Iran would be noticeably tougher in a Clinton or Trump administration than it was during the Obama administration.
In summary, you’re dealing with an Iranian side with very little flexibility and/or political will for negotiation on the missile issue and an American side with position that’s ambiguous at best, along with a new executive who will likely take an equally hard line. This would all be for negotiations on an issue that does not pose a very serious threat to the United States, nor to its regional partners.
Designating the Iranian missile program a priority under such conditions would achieve nothing except the perpetuation of the mutual enmity and gridlock that has defined U.S.-Iran relations since the revolution. The progress made towards ending (or at least reducing) the pervasive maximalism in both sides’ negotiating postures with the JCPOA should not be wasted on something that is, at this point in time, such a dead-end endeavor.

A more prudent diplomatic strategy would be to focus on an issue (or issues) where the interests of the United States and Iran are closer than they are on the missile program. One option could be narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran. Another potential option is discussing each other’s intentions in Persian Gulf waters. Whatever the choice, the specifics aren’t as important as the process. As long as it’s something that shows the other side that there is something to be achieved by negotiating with you.

Negotiating with Iran, or with the United States for that matter, will never be easy, nor will it ever be without hurt feelings. However, neither does it have to be doomed to devolve into the tit-for-tat exercise in positional bargaining that would almost surely come to pass if future negotiations between Iran and the United States are myopically focused on Iran’s missiles.

Robert Andrea is an incoming postgraduate student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His research primarily focuses on Iranian politics & foreign policy, diplomatic strategy, and proxy warfare as statecraft.

Iran horn pursuing nuclear weapons program (Dan 8:3)

  
Iran pursuing nuclear weapons program during talks, Pentagon warns

NCRI Iran News
Thursday, 04 June 2015 21:42

Iran is continuing to develop missiles capable of delivering a nuclear bomb in defiance of an interim agreement with the West, a Pentagon report has revealed.

The unclassified document which a copy was obtained by the Washington Free Beacon was not sent to the US Armed Services Committee until this month to avoid upsetting Tehran during its nuclear negotiations with the West.

The report states: “Although Iran has paused progress in some areas of its nuclear program and fulfilled its obligations under the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), it continues to develop technological capabilities that also could be applicable to nuclear weapons, including ballistic missile development.”

It added: “Iran continues to develop its capabilities to control the Strait of Hormuz and avenues of approach in the event of a military conflict.

“Tehran is quietly fielding increasingly lethal weapon systems, including more advanced naval mines, small but capable submarines, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, coastal defense cruise missile batteries, attack craft, and ant ship-capable missiles.”

It also said Tehran had not halted its support for terrorism, adding: “Iran’s covert activities appear to be continuing unabated. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) remains a key tool of lran’s foreign policy and power projection, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.”

The IRGC Quds Force also is continuing to improve its access within foreign countries and its ability to carry terrorist attacks ‘to safeguard or advance Iran’s interests’, the report said.

It continued: “The ongoing civil war in Syria and the instability in Iraq have tested, but not fundamentally altered, this posture.

“Meanwhile, over the past year, the tone of publicity surrounding major military exercises has remained tempered, a trend that began in 2013, probably in support of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear activities.”

The report, dated January 2015, concludes that Iran has not substantively altered its military and security strategies in the past year.

It added: “However, Tehran has adjusted its approach to achieve its enduring objectives, by increasing its diplomatic outreach and decreasing its bellicose rhetoric.

“The committee remains concerned about the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile development programs.

“In 2013, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) made the following statement about this system: Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.”

Iran Continues To Develop Nuclear Weapons (Dan 8)

 


US: Iran may still be developing tech for nuclear arms

Pentagon assessment comes amid ongoing talks between world powers and Tehran aimed at curbing country’s atomic program

By ADIV STERMAN June 4, 2015, 9:38 am 6

As recently as last week, the US Department of Defense assessed that Iran was still developing technologies that can be used in order to produce nuclear weapons, despite the fact that the Islamic Republic has been engaged in negotiations with world powers aimed at curbing its atomic program, Bloomberg reported Thursday.

Quoting an unclassified summary from a Pentagon document on Iran’s military capabilities, the report said that Tehran has been conducting research that “could be applicable to nuclear weapons,” but has nevertheless “fulfilled its obligations” to the P5+1 world powers and “paused progress” in parts of its nuclear program.

The summary was part of a report that will include other classified details regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The Pentagon report was submitted to congressional defense committees last week.

According to Bloomberg, the report further stated that aside from the alarming activity possibly linked to its nuclear program, Iran’s “covert activities [in the region] appear to be continuing unabated,” and the Islamic Republic still aims to spread its influence across the Middle East, “particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.”

The Pentagon went on to assess that Iran’s military doctrine was primarily defensive, “designed to deter an attack, survive an initial strike, and retaliate against an aggressor [and] force a diplomatic solution to hostilities.” The report noted, however, that the “ongoing civil war in Syria and the instability in Iraq have tested, but not fundamentally altered, this posture.”

Ahead of a self-imposed June 30 nuclear deal deadline, US and Iranian diplomats met over the weekend in what US officials described as the most substantive negotiating round since world powers and Iran clinched a framework pact in April. The sides are trying to narrow differences over how quickly to ease economic penalties against Tehran and how significantly the Iranians must open up military facilities to international inspections.

Tehran denies claims by the West and its allies, including Israel, that it is seeking nuclear weapons, and insists that it is pursuing atomic energy purely for peaceful purposes.

On Sunday, Reuters reported that the global powers taking part in the negotiations with Iran had established a mechanism of “snapping back” sanctions against Tehran in the event the Islamic Republic violates the nuclear deal. An anonymous Iranian official told Reuters there were several suggestions on the table with regard to sanctions, warning that Tehran reserves the right to resume its activities if the world powers “do not fulfill their obligations.”

The “snap back” mechanism was not explained in detail in the report, though Western officials said it would not involve a UN Security Council resolution. The US and European states want sanctions to be automatic, while Russia and China do not.

The timeline for sanctions relief has been one of the key sticking points in talks over a final agreement.

While the negotiating countries have until June 30 to reach a final, comprehensive agreement, some countries have suggested there might be a deadline extension.

Israel has warned that the deal in its current form is insufficient and may still enable Iran to to develop nuclear weapons. Iran insists its nuclear project will be used for peaceful purposes only.

AFP, AP, and Times of Israel Staff contributed to this report.

Trying To Put The Genie Back In The Bottle (Dan 8:3)

World powers look for rigid restrictions on Iran’s centrifuge development in talks

Senior German official tells Haaretz that ‘R&D is a big deal,’ so that breakout time for bomb isn’t too quick.

By Barak Ravid

Published 06:00 05.05.15

 

The six world powers negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran want the agreement to include rigid restrictions on Iran’s research and development work on advanced centrifuges, both during the agreement’s first 10 years and for some years thereafter, a senior German official familiar with the talks told Haaretz.

 

“R&D is a big deal,” said the official, who asked to remain anonymous due to the diplomatic sensitivity of the negotiations. “The final deal must include clear restrictions on R&D, so that enrichment capacity does not go through the roof.”

The official said the German government is in regular contact with its Israeli counterpart over the nuclear negotiations, at the level of both experts and politicians. National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen will arrive in Berlin today for talks, with Iran top of the list.

The issue of research and development is one of Israel’s primary concerns about the emerging nuclear deal, which is supposed to be finalized by June 30. Iran’s research on advanced centrifuges could significantly shorten its breakout time – the time it would need to build a nuclear weapon if it decided to eject UN inspectors and start enriching uranium at full speed, to the necessary level of 90 percent.

Currently, Iran’s breakout time is about two to three months. Under the emerging deal between Iran and the P5+1, its breakout time is supposed to be at least a year for the next 10 years.

Most of Iran’s centrifuges are older models, though it has a few newer models that can enrich uranium three or four times faster. Under the emerging deal, Iran would be able to use only its older centrifuges for the first 10 years.

But the Iranians are currently developing even more advanced models that could enrich uranium six to eight times faster than the older ones. Tehran is demanding that its R&D work on new centrifuges be allowed to continue unhindered. But the six powers fear that if R&D continues at the pace it has until now, then when the agreement expires, Iran will have highly advanced centrifuges that would let it enrich enough uranium for a bomb very quickly.

Two weeks ago, the nuclear negotiations resumed in Vienna for the first time since a framework deal was reached in Lausanne last month. Tehran had been furious over the fact sheet the White House distributed on the Lausanne framework. Consequently, the P5+1 had feared domestic pressure might cause the Iranians to renege on some of the understandings, the German official said. But that didn’t happen. “The last round of talks in Vienna was positive,” he said. “There were concerns that the Iranians might backtrack on some of the understandings from Lausanne, and they didn’t.

“Lausanne was a big step forward and we closed many gaps, and we have a good basis for the last steps toward a comprehensive agreement,” he added. “The feeling in Vienna was that everybody wants to get a deal by June 30, and that this is possible.”

But R&D isn’t the only unresolved issue. Another is what powers International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors will have. “Inspections and transparency are crucial,” the official said. “This must not be a deal that gives Iran the benefit of the doubt. That is why IAEA inspectors will get far-reaching access. However, the Iranians know that we have red lines and that we will not give up our principles just to get a deal,” he added. “The Iranians also need a deal, they must deliver to their people.”

Impossible To Stop Nuclear Proliferation

The nuclear danger

 

Nuclear Testing Monitoring

 

Rizwan Asghar
 

Tuesday, May 06, 2014

The trafficking of nuclear technologies and materials has been a worrisome issue since the early 1950s but after 9/11 it emerged as a global threat. This threat is totally different today because of the widespread dissemination of technological expertise and nuclear-weapons-related knowledge.

Illicit trade refers to trade not authorised by the state in which it originates and is imported by other states in contravention of international law. Last year in October, a Washington-based think tank, Institute for Science and International Security, released a report that indicated more than half a dozen countries – including India, Pakistan and North Korea – as ‘illicit nuclear trade suppliers of concern’. The report further argued that in the absence of immediate measures to control exports, countries like Brazil, Turkey, Russia, Argentina, and portions of Eastern Europe could also become potential suppliers of sensitive nuclear commodities.

Preventing the unauthorised spread of classified information related to nuclear technology is also a difficult challenge because terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are likely to gain access to sensitive information that could be helpful in their quest for nuclear capabilities. More recently, newly emerging threats like industrial espionage and cyber-theft have enhanced the chances of leakage of sensitive information critical to the development of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, these days many dual-use technologies are imported under legal cover and later put to use in the development of nuclear weapons. Such trafficking of nuclear materials involves not only fissile material but other technologies like centrifuges used for enrichment purposes as well. Despite many US-led efforts to secure nuclear materials from vulnerable sites across the globe, mitigating the problem of illicit nuclear trade remains a long haul.

Since the early 1960s, almost all states that have nuclear power status have achieved it using illegal smuggling methods to obtain necessary nuclear material and technology. Over the next five to ten years, the problem may get worse because of the increasing number of actors involved in nuclear black-market trading. Several more countries are striving to acquire nuclear capability and those that already possess nuclear weapons are working to improve them. States with nuclear weapons, including India and Pakistan, are expected to continue procuring from abroad to modernise their nuclear arsenals.

Nuclear smuggling networks have become increasingly interconnected and sophisticated. Countries that have developed secret nuclear weapons programmes, are acquiring nuclear subcomponents and ‘dual-use goods’ to operate nuclear facilities on their own. Control of dual-use goods is extremely difficult because suppliers can easily be misled into believing that these items will be used only for civilian purposes.

Over the past two decades, even in countries like the US and Japan that have very strict export control regulations, shadowy networks of nuclear proliferators have tricked suppliers into selling sensitive material and technologies. In order to hide their final destination, illegal procurements are routed through many other countries, also known as ‘turntables’, with weak or nonexistent export controls.

Some developed countries like South Korea and Japan also have the potential to pose a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation agenda because these countries possess enough technological expertise, fissile material and scientific capacity to build nuclear weapons within a short span of time. So there must be a strong policy to discourage additional countries from building uranium enrichment or plutonium separation facilities and making bilateral and regional agreements to the effect of establishing nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) remains the most effective way to achieve the desired outcome.

Another related problem is that developing countries do not give the required priority to strengthening export control laws because of the lack of awareness regarding the threats posed by illicit nuclear trade. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community led by the US must pay attention to this issue and impress upon other countries to make and strictly enforce export control laws.

There are widespread apprehensions about Iran’s involvement in covert smuggling operations aimed at obtaining materials and centrifuges for its nuclear program. There are concerns that most of the sensitive commodities were acquired by different trade companies, secretly working for the Iranian government, from other countries in complete violation of the latter’s national trade control laws. After the recent Geneva deal, prospects of a final solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis are somewhat promising but if the deal fails Iran may continue on its path to developing nuclear weapons by acquiring sensitive goods illegally.

One of the serious challenges faced by current export control regimes is the lack of universal methods to detect nuclear trafficking. A well-established early detection mechanism can go a long way in preventing illicit nuclear trade. The US and other major nuclear powers must work to develop a cooperative mechanism to interdict illicit nuclear trade.

The UN Security Council and other multilateral export control regimes can play their role, rendering it almost next to impossible for proliferant states to obtain sensitive goods. Coupled with these initiatives, a ‘Universal Standard against Illicit Nuclear Trade’ must be created to measure and improve compliance efforts by various countries. This benchmark should provide certain incentives to states willing to curb illicit smuggling and pressurise unwilling states to comply with the export control guidelines. Legal processes in all countries should also be strengthened in order to effectively prosecute and punish people involved in the business of nuclear smuggling.

The ultimate goal of these measures should be to construct insurmountable obstacles against illicit procurement networks and nuclear smugglers, minimising the chances of a state or non-state actor being in a position to illegally proliferate nuclear technology. The international community must join hands to conclude legally binding ‘arms control treaties’ stigmatising the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Last but not the least, progressive efforts need to ensure that the FMCT and the CTBT enter into force of before the 2015 NPT Review Conference; this can more adequately save the world from the dangers of nuclear weapons.

The writer is a research scholar and a former visiting fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California.