Babylon the Great Will Have to Target the IRGC in Iran

The US may have to target the IRGC in Iran to stop Iraq base attacks

Escalating Iranian-orchestrated attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq are unlikely to stop until President Trump orders limited retaliation against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets on Iranian soil.

The growing challenge is obvious following two significant rocket attacks this week on the U.S. military’s Camp Taji.

The first attack killed two U.S. service members and one British soldier. A second attack on Saturday morning wounded three Americans and two Iraqis. Both attacks were carried out by Iran’s Kata’ib Hezbollah militia proxy, under direction from Iran’s IRGC. But what makes these attacks particularly concerning is that they are designed to kill. That might seem obvious, but the use hereof numerous rockets targeting areas of Camp Taji where soldiers congregate stands these incidents apart from other rocket attacks, which are primarily designed to harass.

In turn, it is clear that Iran has decided to kill Americans. This shows a noticeable strategic development from Iran’s immediate response to the early January killing of IRGC Quds Force Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Then, Iran was willing to accept a posturing-based retaliation rather than one actually intended to kill Americans.

But mark my words, Iran rather than Kata’ib Hezbollah, is responsible here.

Yes, Kata’ib Hezbollah lost their leader in the U.S. strike, which killed Soleimani, and thus has a motive for retaliation. Except for one thing: The group does not conduct lethal-focus attacks on U.S. interests without prior approval from Soleimani’s successor and mentee, IRGC Quds Force commander, Esmail Ghaani. The nature and rapid succession of these two attacks on Camp Taji reflect a new standing order from Ghaani to escalate. More attacks must thus be expected to follow in the near term future.

So what should the United States do?

Well, retaliating against Kata’ib Hezbollah, as following the first attack this week, is inadequate. Iran clearly didn’t view that retaliation as serious, or it wouldn’t have allowed this second attack to occur. Kata’ib Hezbollah is the sideshow here, Iran is the key problem. But the U.S. has alternate options.

At the top-line level, the loss of two Americans this week shows an imminent and continuing threat. So Trump does not need congressional authority to take limited action against the IRGC inside Iran. And that’s important because the U.S. could likely restore deterrent balance by targeting one or several IRGC military sites. The catastrophic impact that the coronavirus is wreaking on Iranian civil society means that the regime is under immense pressure. This pressure is exacerbated by U.S. efforts to support the growing protest movement. And while these attacks and Iranian escalations on the nuclear front are designed toward coercing the U.S. into sanctions relief, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cannot risk an escalatory showdown with the U.S. The supreme leader won’t admit it, but he knows it’s a showdown he can’t win.

Limited strikes in Iran rather than inside Iraq would also serve another purpose. Namely, mitigating the risk of further inflaming Iraqi populist anger. Iraqi parliamentarians have pushed for the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq over the Soleimani incident. And that withdrawal would be bad news for our interests, strengthening Iran’s sectarian malfeasance in Baghdad, a driver for ISIS recruitment, at a time where it is rising again.

Regardless, unless Trump acts, the Iranians will keep killing Americans.