“They broke the law,” Sunni lawmaker Hamid al-Mutlaq told The
Washington Times, referring to reports of human rights abuses by the
militias, ranging from looting of Sunni homes and mosques to mass
kidnappings and extrajudicial killings of Sunni civilians.
Did the government of Iraqi President Haider al-Abadi control the
behavior of the militias? “No,” said a seething Mr. al-Mutlaq, who
complained that Iraqi military troops and Shiite political leaders were
nowhere to be seen when Shiite fighters rounded up between 600 and 700
Sunni men in Fallujah who’ve never been seen since.
“Where was the government then?” he said in an interview this summer.
What began as a desperate, stopgap campaign by Iraqi leaders to stem
Islamic State forces from overrunning Baghdad and other major cities in
the country is now fueling a
new
era of sectarian violence, as a formidable array of Shiite militias
casts a dark shadow over the Iraqi military’s recent battlefield
successes.
American commanders have become increasingly wary that the more
integral the militias become to the battle plan, the weaker Baghdad’s
ability will be to rein in the paramilitary force — which now numbers
over
120,000 fighters.
What’s worse, many here fear the growing strength of the Shiite
militias has blown the door wide open for Tehran to expand its already
formidable influence in Iraq — feeding off a sectarian war the
Sunni-based Islamic State is seeking to reignite in the country. Iraq’s
majority Shiite population, which has long felt oppressed by the Sunni
minority, has long had religious and political ties to Tehran.
But how bad could a bigger Iranian role be? It’s a question on the
minds of political leaders and armed factions across Iraq, where many
say the alternative of sustained Islamic State control over large parts
of the country would be far worse.
Some even wonder why U.S. officials haven’t actually done more to get
behind the al-Abadi government’s reliance on the Shiite militias, who
are known in Arabic as the “Hashid Shaabi” or simply “Hashid.”
“If you speak to the American authorities and ask, ‘Are you worried
about ISIS?’ they will say, ‘No, we are worried about the Hashid,’” said
Rayyan al-Kildani, commander of a 2,500-man Christian militia around
Baghdad known as the “Babylon Brigade.”
“I do not know why the American authorities consider the Hashid as
criminals,” Mr. al-Kildani told The Times in a July interview at his
home in Karrada, a predominantly Shiite neighborhood of the Iraqi
capital.
“We can sit and [work] with anyone,” he said. “Can ISIS do the same? No.”
Iraqi defense officials seem to agree. They’ve been scrambling for
months to incorporate the militias into the country’s armed services. In
July former Defense Minister Khaled al-Obaidi said the Hashid would be
formally placed under the command of the Ministry of Defense.
It was not clear whether the move was driven by a desire to undercut
Iran’s influence or something more sobering: the fear that, without some
restraint, the Hashid may soon replace Islamic State as Baghdad’s top
security concern by establishing their own Shiite-controlled outposts
throughout Iraq.
Shia Islamic State
Concern about the Shiite militias runs deepest in northern Iraq,
where Kurdish peshmerga forces are manning the advancing front outside
the Islamic State-held city of Mosul.
It comes out whenever discussion among the peshmerga turns to the
role the Hashid might play in the coming assault on the city. There’s a
specific term that gets used in hushed tones over cups of tea or quiet
conversation with cigarettes:
“Shia ISIS.”
Some Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds believe it’s the best way to describe the
Shiite militias amid ever-growing reports of the human rights
atrocities they’ve committed — more often than not, they insist, with
the knowledge of the Iraqi security forces they’ve fought beside.
A Human Rights Watch report in June confirmed more than 600 Sunni men
from Fallujah showed signs of severe torture and abuse while being
detained by a particularly menacing Iran-backed militia known as the
Kata’ib Hezbollah, as well as another southern Iraq-based group militia
known as the Badr Brigades. Shiite fighters reportedly said the
detentions were conducted in order to see if any of the men were
actually Islamic State members hoping to slip through Iraqi government
lines.
Many of Sunni men remained in captivity this summer.
At one U.N. refugee camp in the city of Al-Amiriyah — about 20 miles
south of Fallujah — the camp’s roughly 3,000 residents were almost
entirely women and children.
One of the few men in the camp said in an interview that nearly
all
of the fathers, brothers and sons were still being detained and
interrogated by Iraqi government forces and Shia militiamen. The
man, a Sunni who did not want to be quoted by name, said he and a
handful of others got free by bribing their way out; those who couldn’t
pay remain in government custody.
Back in Baghdad, Sunni political leaders fear the situation is about
to play out anew in northern Iraq if the al-Abadi government allows the
Shiite militias to participate in the Mosul campaign. “We will get the
same results,” Mr. Mutlaq, the Sunni lawmaker, warned.
“Do the Americans want to see Iraq shredded apart and handed to Iran?” he asked. “If so, then it will be in the hands of God.”
U.S. commanders say any role the militias play in Mosul will
influence an Iraqi decision — one Baghdad has yet to make. But there’s
no doubt the Shiite militias would add considerable firepower to the
assault.
If the al-Abadi government grants a role for the militias in the
fight for Mosul, over 15,000 fighters could take part in the operation,
said Muhammed al-Oqabi, a spokesman for Public Mobilization Commission,
the government body created to work with the militias.
The Shiite forces can be trusted, he argued, asserting that the fear
of them “occupying the Sunni cities does not exist, except in the minds
of some politicians.”
Golden Division
One plan to incorporate the Shiite militias into the Mosul campaign
would be to reorganize the militias as a paramilitary force, similar to
the so-called Iraqi Special Forces 1st Brigade that is known as the
“Golden Division.”
The militias would not be
officially designated as Iraqi military units, but they would be
federalized under Baghdad’s control — armed, paid and taking orders from
the Iraqi government.
Such a move, according to Mr. al-Oqabi, would place Shiite fighters
under the military’s chain of command, but still allow for a certain
level of autonomy.
But critics suggest Iranian interlocutors may be lurking behind the
plan and assert that it would essentially create an Iraqi version of
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC, which also does not fall
directly under the command of Iran’s military or the elected government,
but are loyal to and controlled by Iran’s theocratic rulers.
Militia commanders and other officials expressed in interviews only tepid support for the Golden Division plan.
Safaa al-Timeemi, spokesman for Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s
Saraya Al-Salam militia, said his organization might embrace the plan
because they would be able to work with Iraqi government troops without
having to fight under the government’s flag.
Mr. Sadr’s militia controls
as much as 2,000 square miles of territory, mostly in the Nineveh
province of northern Iraq. “We commit to the direction and orders of
[Muqtada al-Sadr],” Mr. al-Tameemi said. “If he says we should be part
of this new organization, then we will. If not, then we will not.
“We are not a replacement for the [Iraqi] army, but we are in support of the army,” he said.
After helping to liberate areas from Islamic State around Baghdad last year,
the
Sadr-aligned militia quickly went to work setting up hospitals,
schools, emergency services and other public infrastructure devastated
in the fighting, Mr. al-Tameemi added.
“Our objectives are religious and military,” he added, suggesting
that formally incorporating the militias into the national army may not
help to legitimize its image beyond Iraq. “Our true image has to reach
the U.S. [commanders]” in Baghdad, Mr. al-Tameemi said.
Christian militia commander Mr. al-Kildani said that the Shiite
militias have gained force in Iraq because of the military’s previous
failures to hold back Islamic State — and it will now be up to Baghdad
to fashion the variety of anti-Islamic State groups into a cohesive
coalition.
“Once ISIS is defeated in Iraq, it will be up to [Baghdad] to see
what will happen,” he said. “Whatever they order, we will follow.”
“All Iraqis revolted against ISIS,” not just the Shiite militias, the
Christian militia commander said. “When ISIS came, the peshmerga did
not protect us. The army did not protect us.”
Despite all the hand-wringing over the risks of allowing the Shiite
militias to take a major role in the fight, the price of cutting them
out of the anti-ISIS campaign may be much higher, he added.
“There is a saying, ‘You don’t ask who buried the snake, you ask who
killed it,’” Mr. Kildani said. “It was the Hashid who killed the snake.
The [Iraqi] army only buried it.
“If it wasn’t for the Hashid,” he added, “[Islamic State head] Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi would have taken Baghdad and would be living in the
Green Zone.”
