Friday, September 23, 2016

The Age of "Conventional" Nuclear Weapons

Sachin Parashar | TNN | Sep 21, 2016, 07.49AM IST
A potential low-yield, tactical nuclear weapon strike by Pakistan is perhaps the single most important factor preventing the Modi government from taking military action against Pakistan in haste. While the threat from these weapons has been described by some in India as just a Pakistani red herring, the same will play on the minds of policy makers if they indeed decide to go ahead with any cross-border strike.
As the director of Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project, Hans Kristensen remains one of the world's leading authorities on Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. He first wrote in 2011 that Pakistan's production of the nuclear-capable 60-km Nasr missile was not intended to target any Indian ci ty but to check an Indian Army advance. TOI caught up with Kristensen to find out how credible was the threat from Pakistan's tactical nukes:
Does the prospect of a flare-up between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, after the Uri attack worry you?
Yes, that is potentially a dangerous situation. However, a Pakistani decision to use nuclear weapons in response to an Indian incursion is not automatic but would very much depend on the magnitude of the Indian incursion.
When exactly do you think Pakistan could put to use its tactical nuclear weapons?
Smaller operations would be very unlikely to trigger nuclear use but would certainly trigger conventional responses. And once a conventional confrontation breaks out and more forces are thrown into the battle, it would potentially escalate to nuclear weapons use if Pakistan concluded that it couldn't push back the Indian attack.
What about the effectiveness of these weapons for Pakistan?
As for the effectiveness, nuclear weapons could no doubt create significant problems for an attacking force. But it very much depends on how the attack is structured. Indian forces would have to attack in fairly concentrated formations for nuclear weapons to be useful. And a nuclear counter-attack could actually end up requiring a large number of warheads. When the US examined potential use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iraq it concluded that it would not be a limited matter but require a significant number of weapons.
What can Indian forces do to limit the damage from a low-yield nuclear weapon?
If the Indian forces were not coming in a heavily concentrated form but more dispersed and from different directions, it would be much more complicated to counter them.
Could Pakistan itself not suffer from the radioactive fallout of its tactical nukes?
The radioactive fallout from the weapons would be indiscriminate; it would fall wherever the wind blows. So if the Indian forces were attacking with the wind in their back, the radioactive fallout would drift across Pakistan, not India.
In these circumstances, can India afford to use the military option?
Because of these risks, it would be reckless and highly risky for India to strike into Pakistan in revenge for the terrorist attacks. It would carry with it consequences that would far exceed the damage caused by the terrorist attacks. Sound strategy —especially nuclear strategy -— requires cool heads, not hasty reactive military spasms.

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