China vs. U.S.- The Nuclear Edition
By Brinda Banerjee on December 26, 2015 10:13 am in Politics
That China is investing heavily into rapidly modernizing its nuclear capabilities is no secret. Beijing has tested several weapons and defense systems in recent years and prioritized the development of long-range nuclear-capable missiles that can be outfitted with several warheads and can be deployed over a variety of platforms (aerial, terrestrial and nautical). And the U.S. is aware of these developments, as evidenced by a recent statement by Pentagon spokesman Commander Bill Urban who said, “We do not comment on PRC weapons tests, but we do monitor Chinese military modernization carefully.”
Why Does China’s Nuclear Agenda Matter?
China’s developments along military modernization lines are interesting in terms of what they hold for the future of the U.S.-China relationship. At present, China’s nuclear agenda is organized along the ‘assured retaliation’ concept, rooted in the Cold War-era principle of mutually assured destruction. However, with time and unparalleled weaponization, China could well discard the response-only approach in favor of a more aggressive agenda.
A recent piece in the International Security journal by MIT-based researchers Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel titled ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,’ touches upon the possibility of China adopting a “first-use posture”. If China were to pursue such a policy change, the authors believe it “will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability.”
What Is China’s Nuclear Position At Present?
The concept of a strong second-strike capacity continues to drive China’s nuclear agenda. In ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,’ the authors opine, “In general, China has sought to maintain the smallest possible force capable of surviving a first strike and being able to conduct a retaliatory strike that would inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary, at the time and place of China’s choosing. Rather than expend all of its nuclear forces in a single, massive retaliatory strike, China has structured its nuclear forces to conduct multiple waves of large- or small-scale retaliatory strikes.”
A potent influencer over China’s present-day nuclear posture is the concept of ‘yanmi fanghu’ or ‘close defense’. The principle is rooted in making sure that China’s forces survive in any and all situations, including a military attack and nuclear warfare. The idea is to promote endurance by mastering defense practices such as mobility and concealment. The concept of ‘key-point counterstrikes’ or ‘zhongdian fanji’ also continues to drive China: the idea is to optimize retaliation-oriented techniques and mechanisms to best destroy an enemy.
The study establishes that China’s current nuclear posture, much like China’s overall military posture, is designed not along an independent model but in relation to China’s traditional rivals and/or states with equal or more power. The authors explain: “How much is enough for China? The answer to this question has always been relative to a potential adversary’s capabilities, namely, those of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Historically, China’s leaders have lacked confidence in their ability to assure retaliation. At times, either China has lacked enough weapons or the weapons that it possessed were not sufficiently survivable. By the mid-1990s, for example, China only possessed approximately twenty DF-5 ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States. These missiles were liquid fueled, which increased the time required to prepare them for launch and reduced their reliability and survivability. The missiles were vulnerable to an enemy strike while they were being fueled, as were the fuel storage areas. China was also concerned about the reliability of its missile technology and the reconnaissance capabilities of its opponents. As a result,China sought to modernize its forces to increase survivability and penetrability. This included developing two road-mobile, solid-fueled missile systems, the DF-31 and DF-31A, as well as a submarine-launched variant, the JL-2, to be used aboard the new Type-094 class of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). China’s first-generation Type-092-class SSBN armed with the JL-1 missile encountered so many technological challenges that it never conducted a single deterrent patrol.”
Is China’s Nuclear Posture Likely To Change?
The U.S. continues to influence Chinese foreign/military policy and experts believe that China encourages a certain mystery about its nuclear capabilities and the no-first-use strategy to be able to retain power in the discussion. Back in the mid-2000s, there was some talk in China about the possibility of abandoning the retaliation-only agenda in light of the prospect of a confrontation with the U.S. over the issue of Taiwan. However, most defense experts believe that as things stand presently, China is not likely to abandon its traditional no-first-use policy, though Beijing will probably allow some ambiguity to persist around the matter.
Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel write, “China is unlikely to alter its nuclear strategy. That is, the pursuit of a lean and effective force to conduct a retaliatory campaign to deter a first strike against China remains the basis of China’s nuclear strategy. Even though China is expanding the size and sophistication of its arsenal, sources and individuals consulted for this article indicate, in essence, that China will seek to achieve the goals contained in its current strategy and not pursue new ones, such as the ability to conduct a first strike on an adversary’s nuclear weapons.”
The authors cite the Science of Military Strategy and explain that the driving force behind China’s military identity is the concept of ‘houfa zhiren’ or “striking after the enemy has struck”. Beijing follows a very pragmatic approach in that the “relative superiority or inferiority of China’s nuclear counterattack capability directly influences the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.”
While a first-use policy would certainly alter the security landscape drastically, it seems that China’s interest in building its nuclear arsenal is presently rooted in developing an effective second-strike and counter-attack capacity that promotes deterrence over actual aggression.
The U.S. Nuclear Factor Continues To Worry China
At the heart of Chinese nuclear policy is the issue of the American nuclear capacity. More specifically, the U.S.’ defense systems. The ballistic missile defense systems built and deployed by the U.S. are the American foil to China’s use of nuclear power as a deterrence mechanism. By developing and using early warning/ early response systems and installing interceptors aimed at detecting and destroying any hostile activity, the U.S. successfully blocks the bulk of China’s nuclear missile potential. The International Security article touches upon the issue from Beijing’s perspective: “China’s strategic community also expects the system to become more integrated and effective in the future. For many, the Obama administration has only slightly altered the Bush administration’s missile defense plan, as U.S. missile defense has bipartisan support and is now a permanent feature of the strategic landscape.”
Where Do China, U.S. Go From Here?
It would seem that China leverages a certain abstruseness about its nuclear positions as part of its nuclear agenda; in playing things close to the chest, Beijing manages to keep foreign defense officials guessing, and so, keeps them on their toes. However, there is a palpable risk to encouraging uncertainty, as identified by Cunningham and Fravel: “To deter U.S. conventional attacks on its nuclear forces, however, China relies on limited ambiguity over its no-first-use policy, which could make a future U.S.-Chinese crisis more dangerous. China appears willing to accept this risk because its assessments of crisis stability in the U.S.-China relationship are relatively optimistic…Even if Chinese analysts accurately assess the nuclear risks present in a U.S.-China contingency, their optimism is unwarranted because it is not shared by the United States and because China likely underestimates U.S. assessments of the stakes in a potential crisis.”
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