Why North Korea Is Not One Of Ten Nuclear Horns (Daniel 7:7)

Daryl Kimball: Near zero chance of premeditated attack

North Korea’s nuclear weapons test explosion on 12 February 2013 – its third – has been the single-most worrisome development in recent years.

The blast was conducted in defiance of Pyongyang’s lone remaining ally, China. The explosion was the first under the reign of Kim Jong-un, a signal that he was doubling down on a more confrontational approach vis-à-vis the rest of the world rather than seeking a more moderate path.
One more test does not fundamentally change the security threat North Korea poses. But this test, unlike the two previous ones, produced a significant yield of about six to seven kilotons. The use of highly enriched uranium is significant because North Korea’s plutonium supply is limited, perhaps enough for fewer than 10 bombs.

If its nuclear and missile programmes continue unchecked, the risk that Pyongyang sells fissile material to another country or to terrorists in exchange for much-needed hard currency could increase.

Denuclearisation is still possible, but for now it should not be the precondition for resuming diplomatic efforts to halt further North Korean nuclear and missile advances.

Further sanctions on the North through the UN security council are certainly justified in the wake of the latest nuclear test, but by themselves, will not produce adequate results.

China must recognise that Pyongyang’s continued nuclear pursuits represent a direct threat to its long-term interests and security. Its leaders must take stronger steps to implement existing UN sanctions.

North Korea’s leaders still appear to be willing to abandon portions of their nuclear weapons programme in exchange for improved relations with the US, a formal end to the Korean war, and the possibility of much-needed energy and economic support.

As president Ronald Reagan once said, “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought”. North Korea does not have, and will not have for many years, the means to strike with nuclear weapons beyond the peninsula – that would be suicide. Combined US and South Korean forces would end the Kim dynasty and destroy much of the country. Therefore, there is a near zero chance of a premeditated North Korean nuclear attack.

The serious risk of miscalculations by either side could increase over time if leaders in Seoul make the mistake of trying to develop their own independent nuclear weapons capability – which is all the more reason to renew efforts to freeze, and then later reverse, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes.

Daryl Kimball is executive director of the Arms Control Association