Nuclear Terrorism Will Ignite The First Nuclear War

Terrorist Threats to Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Clear and Present Danger

Sajid Farid Shapoo

Pakistan has the world’s fastest growing nuclear stockpile.[i] Given the rate of plutonium and highly enriched uranium production, it may be able to produce another 200 nuclear warheads in the next 5 to 10 years, taking its arsenal close to 350. The production of such a staggering stockpile has been associated with an extremely worrisome trend; the majority of nuclear warheads produced by Pakistan in last decade are low yield tactical weapons. The rapid tacticalization of a strategic asset in the region considered to be a nuclear flashpoint, has raised a plethora of security and strategy related issues.

Pakistan is the epicenter of global jihadi terrorism. The country has faced some of the most devastating attacks on its defense establishments by the jihadist in the past decade or so. There have been repeated instances where some of these attacks were mounted with the help of insiders within the Pak military establishment. The unabated internal chaos coupled with a perpetual tension with its eastern neighbor, makes Pakistan a bit of a nuclear nightmare. Its willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons even against a limited conventional incursion by India further complicates the situation. Pakistan, however, has repeatedly stated that its weapons are safe and it has a robust and stable security framework to safeguard its nuclear weapons.

This essay is an attempt to assess threats to Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and its nuclear security vulnerability.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Journey: From Strategic to Tactical

After the nuclear tests of May 1998 by both India and Pakistan, nuclear ambiguity became a thing of past. Pakistan was forced to take a fresh look at its doctrine and nuclear posturing, which could provide a dependable and more credible deterrence against its eastern neighbor. Pakistan faced a complex security situation; India with its conventional superiority continued to pose a perceived existential threat, but now with an overt nuclear capability, the threat perception increased several times over. To compound the situation, with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the U.S. geopolitical rationale to support Pakistan was removed. Pakistan realized that it had little choice but to adopt an aggressive nuclear escalation posture. This aggressive posture entailed integration of its nuclear weapons into its military structure to credibly and directly deter Indian conventional attacks. The unambiguous expression of overt nuclear threat after India’s nuclear test led Pakistan to adopt a doctrine where Pakistan could quickly respond to even non-existential threats, thus lowering the nuclear threshold. India’s vastly superior conventional capability coupled with the perceived Cold Start doctrine triggered Pakistan to adopt an aggressive nuclear posturing policy. Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan (retd.) writes:

With its relatively smaller conventional force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more proactive nuclear defensive policy[ii].

With limited battlefield early warning and surveillance capabilities, the Pakistan Army viewed the threshold for nuclear first use as relatively low in a conventional conflict with India— perhaps even preemptive first use.

Cold Start versus TNWs

The Kargil conflict of 1999 and Operation Parakaram of 2001 exposed India’s inability to rapidly mobilize its strike corps. India learned that its slow mobilization provided a wide window for Pakistan to strategize its response to an Indian military buildup. Experts believed that the Indian Army took a long time to mobilize on both occasions which gave Pakistan time to internationalize the conflict and to bring on international pressure for de-escalation. The mobilization of India’s strike corps during Op Parakaram lacked any element of surprise and Pakistan’s modest surveillance capabilities could easily detect their movements’[iii].

The Indian strategic think tank community advocated a complete overhauling of its military doctrine with the aim of developing a rapid strike capability on Pakistan. The thinking was to put in place those strategic capabilities which would enable India to swiftly launch a conventional strike against Pakistan. This new thinking was called Cold Start by the think tank community. The doctrine called for several division-size integrated battle groups to be on a standby alert at all times in order to surge deep into Pakistan across several theaters. This quick thrust would allow India to seize a portion of Pakistan territory, which could be then used to bargain with Pakistan. The strategic matrix entailed that Cold Start would also deter Pakistan from using its nuclear arsenals.

Notwithstanding its capability to execute Cold Start, the Indian Army had long resisted accepting it as a professed strategy of the armed forces. However, in spite of this ambiguity towards accepting Cold Start, Pakistan’s military leadership is convinced that Cold Start is India’s strategic doctrine post 2001. Pakistan, as a result, has shifted its doctrine from strategic deterrence to what it calls‘full spectrum deterrence’. It gives Pakistan the ability to respond to any kind of Indian aggression all along the tactical spectrum through Pakistan’s willingness to implement a nuclear first use policy in a tactical environment. The strategic calculus is narrowed down to deterring a conventionally stronger India. The key elements of ‘Full Spectrum Doctrine’ include forward stationing of short range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons and the ability to mate them quickly.

This posture is supposed to deter any full scale or limited conventional attack by India. The most credible way, Pakistan believes, to deter a conventional war against a nuclear India is to asymmetrically escalate a conflict by threatening first use of tactical nuclear weapons on advancing Indian forces once they cross the border into Pakistan thereby achieving deterrence by denial[iv]. This would, Pakistan believes, blunt India’s conventional assault and give India little justification for a disproportionate nuclear strike on Pakistan’s strategic centers - because Pakistan would not have targeted Indian cities. Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, former Director General of Strategic Planning Division (SPD) and advisor to National of Pakistan maintains that the Pakistan’s short range ‘shoot and scoot’ missile system is in response to India’s larger military conventional threat, adding that Pakistan would not risk retaliation with bigger nuclear weapons[v].

Dynamics of Tactilization: Command and Control Vulnerabilities

Pakistan’s Army appears to have procedures in place to operationalize an already offensively oriented posture, thereby ensuring that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are suitably deployed and are usable in a crisis situation. As Tim Hoyt writes:

“It is apparent that Pakistan’s Command and control procedures are delegative, lean heavily toward the always side of the ‘always/never’ divide, and probably include both devolution and possibly pre-delegation in order to ensure the use of weapons[vi].”

Such delegated command and control structure involves features that enable rapid assembly, accelerated movement, and assured delivery mechanism to maintain the credibility of a tactical first use or asymmetric escalation posture, particularly during crisis situations against India.

The credibility of employment of battlefield tactical weapons is predicated on these being in battle ready mode. However, TNWs by their very nature are more at risk in such a delegated command and control structure. Pakistan’s surge towards production of more tactical nukes makes them vulnerable by their very nature. The vulnerability also stems from their command and control mechanism and also a higher probability of falling into hands of a rouge element or a terrorist organization. As battlefield weapons they need to be under the control of theater commanders. While the decision to deploy them may still be under the National Command Authority, their actual use has to be left to the commander in the field.

Tactical battlefield weapons are short range weapons. Pakistan would typically want their components to be stored away from the Indian frontier, thus minimizing the chance of these falling into enemy hands. Although most of them can be kept disassembled, it is likely that some portion has to be kept in a ready state if they are to prove useful in stopping an Indian incursion and in order to make the deterrence by denial a credible instrument. This inter alia means that tactical weapons in a ready state would have to be stationed close to the frontline. It would be a challenge for the National Command Authority to exercise control on these ‘ready’ weapons which are deployed close to the border. In a chaotic crisis situation, the decision to ‘press nuke’ may rest with a mid-level theater commander with limited eyes on the battlefield. Brigadier General Khan (retd.) concedes that “[a] theater commander would probably [be able to] take matters into his own hands. Should a trade-off be required, battle effectiveness of the nuclear force will trump over centralized control[vii].

Such Command and Control procedures, a result of Pakistan’s heavy tilt towards using TNWs in a crisis situation, makes the entire structure vulnerable to rogue elements within its armed forces. A crisis situation also provides opportunity for non-state actors to take advantage of a fluid situation and try to get their hands on a TNW.

Threats to Pakistan Nuclear Security: Clear and Present

Speaking on the eve of 4th Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama expressed deep concern about the security risks that TNWs face. He feared that the “expanding nuclear arsenal in some countries, with more small nuclear weapons are at a greater risk of theft”.

The terrorist use of nuclear weapons with its tsunami-like global and regional consequences is any country’s worst security nightmare. Pakistan claims to have made significant improvement in nuclear security but there are no independent reports which can sufficiently verify these claims. Pakistan’s opacity in sharing any kind of details about its security procedures makes it impossible to ascertain the veracity of its security claims.

The gradual radicalization of Pakistan’s Army over the past three decades has posed a grave danger to Pakistan’s nuclear security in terms of insider threats. These insiders have time and again allied with various jihadi organizations to strike at the state itself. The gravest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is posed by this insider-jihadi collaboration and the possibility of these two potentially dangerous elements coming together and acquiring a nuclear weapon is perhaps one of the most underappreciated threats to international peace and security.

Insider-Jihadi Cocktail

The possible catastrophic scenario of the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist organization with the active help of rogue insiders nearly played out when a group of navy officers attempted to high-jack a sophisticated Pakistan navy frigate. In Sept 2014, an audacious attack was led by serving and former Pak navy officers to take over the Pakistani Navy frigate PNS Zulfiqar. The alleged plan was to gain control of the vessel, steer it to open sea and then turn its guns on a U.S. naval vessel.[viii] The attack was thwarted by Pakistan navy commandos. Four persons were killed which included two serving officers and an ex-navy officer. All four were associated with Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). It appears the officers on-board were to be joined by other militants who were to arrive by boat and stow away onboard. The plan was to get close to U.S. ships on the high seas and then turn the shipboard weapon systems on the Americans[ix]. Among those killed was former Pakistan Navy Lt. Owais Jakhrani. He had been recently dismissed from the Navy for harboring extremist views. He was the son of a serving senior police official in Karachi and he reportedly played the key role in recruiting naval officers for Al Qaeda. The group was led by a ‘senior officer’ who was even saluted by a navy guard before other guards became suspicious of their presence in the dockyard and alerted commandos[x]. The attackers were armed with assault rifles, rocket launchers and hand grenades. These weapons were smuggled earlier into the dockyard by the attackers and were stored in dockyard lockers. What was more concerning is that these officers had a complete appreciation of on-board procedures and offshore deployment of defensive vessels. Before the operation they had given a presentation to Al Qaeda seniors on the operational details of the proposed attack. Al Qaeda in its media release said the “operation took place under the leadership of two brothers from AQIS, namely Owais Jakhrani (former Second Lieutenant in the Pakistan Navy) and Zeeshan Rafeeq (Second Lieutenant)”. AQIS also released the design sketch of the PNS Zulfiqar[xi]. Al Qaeda said its plan was to use the Zulfiqar to attack U.S. Navy vessels.

In the aftermath of the attack four serving mid-level lieutenant commanders from Karachi were also arrested in the western city of Quetta, allegedly trying to flee to Afghanistan two days after the attempted attack on the Zulfiqar. Nothing was known about these mid-level officers and who were their other colleagues in Navy were till recently. In April 2016 a Pakistan Navy tribunal sentenced five serving Navy officers to death for their role in the attack on the Zulfiqar[xii]. It appears there was a sufficiently large Al Qaeda module operating within the Pakistan Navy as middle level naval commanders. It would not be difficult to imagine that there could be more such modules operating within Pakistan’s Army and Air Force. Imagine a situation where, during a crisis with India, a few of such insiders would be tasked to transport battlefield tactical weapons to the frontline. Such a level of insider threat is what makes Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal extremely vulnerable, more so during a situation of impending crisis, when the arsenal is being moved from the storage station to battlefield deployment. The insider–terrorist cocktail is the most dangerous and credible threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Insider Redux

The spectrum of insider threats range from defense personnel to Pakistan’s nuclear scientist community. In 2001 Bashiruddin Mahmood, the former head of Pakistan’s Khushab Plutonium Reactor, was arrested for links to Al-Qaeda. Mahmood confessed that he and other colleagues had met Osama Bin Laden and discussed the possibility of developing a nuclear weapon[xiii]. This startling revelation led Pakistan to adopt stringent security clearance processes and close monitoring of its nuclear science community. The intelligence about Mahmood’s activities was provided by the U.S. Pakistan was unaware of the activities of its top two nuclear scientists. The possibility of that some of Mahmood’s and remnants of AQ’s (Abdul Qadeer) network evading surveillance and monitoring and forging linkage with state and non-state actors remains clear and present. Al Qaeda has made several attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and nuclear material and for a long time Al Qaeda had a WMD division headed by Egyptian Abdel Aziz Al Masri. He was famously called the ‘nuclear CEO’. Al Masri is still active in Al Qaeda and would probably be scouting for such nuclear scientists or Pakistan Army officers who would provide access to a nuclear weapon. It was reported by CIA that, in 2002-2003, Al Qaeda attempted to buy 3 objects which it thought were nuclear weapons[xiv].

ISIS: The New Threat On The Block

ISIS in its May 2015 issue of ‘Dabiq‘, its online propaganda magazine, boasted about the ability to buy a nuclear weapon through links to corrupt officials in Pakistan. While this may be brushed off as a mere propaganda piece with no truth behind it, it does reveal ISIS interest in nuclear weapons and their appreciation that Pakistan is the likely place where they could obtain one.

Another unique dimension to this threat is the competition between ISIS and Al Qaeda for global jihadi dominance. Al Qaeda seems to have been lagging behind and some experts believe Al Qaeda may be looking to stage a spectacular attack to wrest the initiative from ISIS and reassert itself in the jihadi world. An attack with a nuclear weapon would be top on its list. The Zulfiqar attack may have been an attempt for such an attack.

The Army Alumni Corps: Real and Insidious

In the past 5 years there have been at least a half dozen attacks on facilities that reportedly store Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The Kamra air base near Islamabad has been attacked three times by terrorists belonging to the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP). The extent of terrorist infiltration into Pakistan’s nuclear armed military apparatus was again highlighted when terrorists with alleged intelligence from ‘insiders’ mounted an attack on one of Pakistan’s biggest Naval bases. In 2011, jihadists belonging to the 313 brigade of Illyas Kashmiri attacked the Mehran Naval Base near Karachi. Since 2005, the 313 brigade has acted as an armed extension of Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda has a special unit which focuses on identifying radical elements within the armed forces. This unit is manned by former Pakistani Army officers who worked earlier with Illyas Kashmiri. Kashmiri had a strong contingent of Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan Army alumni as its advisors and members. This alumnus contingent was working under the banner of ‘Jund al -Fida’ (Army of Martyrs), a name suggested by Osama bin Laden. Major (Ret.) Abdur Rehman Hashim directed the operations of ‘Jund al Fida’ on behalf of Ilyas Kashmiri[xv]. He was reportedly detained by Pakistan in 2009 under U.S. pressure and has since been released. Major Hashim had instructed David Headley, one of the primaries accused of the Mumbai terror attacks, to conduct surveillance of the Bhabha Atomic Centre, near Mumbai in 2008[xvi]. Another Pakistan Army, Major Haroon Ashiq, was arrested for the murder of Major General Ameer Alvi in 2009. Major Haroon was the operational head of Jund al Fida. He is also said to have been released some time back. Haroon’s younger brother, Capt. (Ret.) Khurram Shehzad was killed fighting Canadian forces on behalf of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2006[xvii]. With such a battery of ex-army officers at his disposal, it was not surprising that Illyas Kashmiri was able to get vital insider information about entry/exit, deployment of naval airplanes and other strategic information about Mehran Airbase. These army officers use their past contacts to spot radical elements within the forces and then try to get them aligned with Al Qaeda. These ‘insiders’ then provide critical information to groups like Al-Qaeda and TTP.

Conclusion

Responding to U.S. concern about Pakistan’s frenzied race to develop battlefield nuclear weapons, Lt. Gen. (retd.) Khalid Kidwai said that they were there to stay and Pakistan was not going to be apologetic about its TNWs[xviii]. TNWs are becoming cherished a subsystem within Pakistan’s nuclear system. Pakistan’s rapid march towards stockpiling TNWs has been a matter of concern. Even more concerning is its belief that TNWs are the most credible way of deterring an Indian conventional attack. This is in turn has lowered Pakistan’s nuclear threshold to an abysmally low level. The command and control of TNWs in a time of crisis would lie with the theater commander. With no real battlefield eyes, he may prematurely employ a TNW.

Given general acceptance that the Pakistan Army controls its nuclear arsenal, any proliferation or attempts of proliferation would seriously damage the Army’s credibility as guardian of its most prized asset. This possibility should in turn drive the Army to be always on a high alert to counter any threat to its nuclear weapons and installations. An insider attempt would raise serious questions over the Army’s ability to secure its assets. An adverse public opinion may not augur well for the Pakistan Army, which projects itself as the savior of the nation.

The insider rogue threat is very real and credible. Their collaboration with Jihadi elements makes the combination even more sinister. The attacks on Pakistan Navy bases and frigates exposed the vulnerability of Pakistan defenses to such threats.

The Cost of the Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

Scenario Earthquakes for Urban Areas Along the Atlantic Seaboard of the United States

NYCEM

The Sixth Seal: NY City Destroyed

If today a magnitude 6 earthquake were to occur centered on New York City, what would its effects be? Will the loss be 10 or 100 billion dollars? Will there be 10 or 10,000 fatalities? Will there be 1,000 or 100,000 homeless needing shelter? Can government function, provide assistance, and maintain order?At this time, no satisfactory answers to these questions are available. A few years ago, rudimentary scenario studies were made for Boston and New York with limited scope and uncertain results. For most eastern cities, including Washington D.C., we know even less about the economic, societal and political impacts from significant earthquakes, whatever their rate of occurrence.

Why do we know so little about such vital public issues? Because the public has been lulled into believing that seriously damaging quakes are so unlikely in the east that in essence we do not need to consider them. We shall examine the validity of this widely held opinion.

Is the public’s earthquake awareness (or lack thereof) controlled by perceived low Seismicity, Seismic Hazard, or Seismic Risk? How do these three seismic features differ from, and relate to each other? In many portions of California, earthquake awareness is refreshed in a major way about once every decade (and in some places even more often) by virtually every person experiencing a damaging event. The occurrence of earthquakes of given magnitudes in time and space, not withstanding their effects, are the manifestations of seismicity. Ground shaking, faulting, landslides or soil liquefaction are the manifestations of seismic hazard. Damage to structures, and loss of life, limb, material assets, business and services are the manifestations of seismic risk. By sheer experience, California’s public understands fairly well these three interconnected manifestations of the earthquake phenomenon. This awareness is reflected in public policy, enforcement of seismic regulations, and preparedness in both the public and private sector. In the eastern U.S., the public and its decision makers generally do not understand them because of inexperience. Judging seismic risk by rates of seismicity alone (which are low in the east but high in the west) has undoubtedly contributed to the public’s tendency to belittle the seismic loss potential for eastern urban regions.

Let us compare two hypothetical locations, one in California and one in New York City. Assume the location in California does experience, on average, one M = 6 every 10 years, compared to New York once every 1,000 years. This implies a ratio of rates of seismicity of 100:1. Does that mean the ratio of expected losses (when annualized per year) is also 100:1? Most likely not. That ratio may be closer to 10:1, which seems to imply that taking our clues from seismicity alone may lead to an underestimation of the potential seismic risks in the east. Why should this be so?

To check the assertion, let us make a back-of-the-envelope estimate. The expected seismic risk for a given area is defined as the area-integrated product of: seismic hazard (expected shaking level), assets ($ and people), and the assets’ vulnerabilities (that is, their expected fractional loss given a certain hazard – say, shaking level). Thus, if we have a 100 times lower seismicity rate in New York compared to California, which at any given point from a given quake may yield a 2 times higher shaking level in New York compared to California because ground motions in the east are known to differ from those in the west; and if we have a 2 times higher asset density (a modest assumption for Manhattan!), and a 2 times higher vulnerability (again a modest assumption when considering the large stock of unreinforced masonry buildings and aged infrastructure in New York), then our California/New York ratio for annualized loss potential may be on the order of (100/(2x2x2)):1. That implies about a 12:1 risk ratio between the California and New York location, compared to a 100:1 ratio in seismicity rates.

From this example it appears that seismic awareness in the east may be more controlled by the rate of seismicity than by the less well understood risk potential. This misunderstanding is one of the reasons why earthquake awareness and preparedness in the densely populated east is so disproportionally low relative to its seismic loss potential. Rare but potentially catastrophic losses in the east compete in attention with more frequent moderate losses in the west. New York City is the paramount example of a low-probability, high-impact seismic risk, the sort of risk that is hard to insure against, or mobilize public action to reduce the risks.

There are basically two ways to respond. One is to do little and wait until one or more disastrous events occur. Then react to these – albeit disastrous – “windows of opportunity.” That is, pay after the unmitigated facts, rather than attempt to control their outcome. This is a high-stakes approach, considering the evolved state of the economy. The other approach is to invest in mitigation ahead of time, and use scientific knowledge and inference, education, technology transfer, and combine it with a mixture of regulatory and/or economic incentives to implement earthquake preparedness. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) has attempted the latter while much of the public tends to cling to the former of the two options. Realistic and reliable quantitative loss estimation techniques are essential to evaluate the relative merits of the two approaches.

The current efforts in the eastern U.S., including New York City, to start the enforcement of seismic building codes for new constructions are important first steps in the right direction. Similarly, the emerging efforts to include seismic rehabilitation strategies in the generally needed overhaul of the cities’ aged infrastructures such as bridges, water, sewer, power and transportation is commendable and needs to be pursued with diligence and persistence. But at the current pace of new construction replacing older buildings and lifelines, it will take many decades or a century before a major fraction of the stock of built assets will become seismically more resilient than the current inventory is. For some time, this leaves society exposed to very high seismic risks. The only consolation is that seismicity on average is low, and, hence with some luck, the earthquakes will not outpace any ongoing efforts to make eastern cities more earthquake resilient gradually. Nevertheless, M = 5 to M = 6 earthquakes at distances of tens of km must be considered a credible risk at almost any time for cities like Boston, New York or Philadelphia. M = 7 events, while possible, are much less likely; and in many respects, even if building codes will have affected the resilience of a future improved building stock, M = 7 events would cause virtually unmanageable situations. Given these bleak prospects, it will be necessary to focus on crucial elements such as maintaining access to cities by strengthening critical bridges, improving the structural and nonstructural performance of hospitals, and having a nationally supported plan how to assist a devastated region in case of a truly severe earthquake. No realistic and coordinated planning of this sort exists at this time for most eastern cities.

The current efforts by the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) via the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) to provide a standard methodology (RMS, 1994) and planning tools for making systematic, computerized loss estimates for annualized probabilistic calculations as well as for individual scenario events, is commendable. But these new tools provide only a shell with little regional data content. What is needed are the detailed data bases on inventory of buildings and lifelines with their locally specific seismic fragility properties. Similar data are needed for hospitals, shelters, firehouses, police stations and other emergency service providers. Moreover, the soil and rock conditions which control the shaking and soil liquefaction properties for any given event, need to be systematically compiled into Geographical Information System (GIS) data bases so they can be combined with the inventory of built assets for quantitative loss and impact estimates. Even under the best of conceivable funding conditions, it will take years before such data bases can be established so they will be sufficiently reliable and detailed to perform realistic and credible loss scenarios. Without such planning tools, society will remain in the dark as to what it may encounter from a future major eastern earthquake. Given these uncertainties, and despite them, both the public and private sector must develop at least some basic concepts for contingency plans. For instance, the New York City financial service industry, from banks to the stock and bond markets and beyond, ought to consider operational contingency planning, first in terms of strengthening their operational facilities, but also for temporary backup operations until operations in the designated facilities can return to some measure of normalcy. The Federal Reserve in its oversight function for this industry needs to take a hard look at this situation.

A society, whose economy depends increasingly so crucially on rapid exchange of vast quantities of information must become concerned with strengthening its communication facilities together with the facilities into which the information is channeled. In principle, the availability of satellite communication (especially if self-powered) with direct up and down links, provides here an opportunity that is potentially a great advantage over distributed buried networks. Distributed networks for transportation, power, gas, water, sewer and cabled communication will be expensive to harden (or restore after an event).

In all future instances of major capital spending on buildings and urban infrastructures, the incorporation of seismically resilient design principles at all stages of realization will be the most effective way to reduce society’s exposure to high seismic risks. To achieve this, all levels of government need to utilize legislative and regulatory options; insurance industries need to build economic incentives for seismic safety features into their insurance policy offerings; and the private sector, through trade and professional organizations’ planning efforts, needs to develop a healthy self-protective stand. Also, the insurance industry needs to invest more aggressively into broadly based research activities with the objective to quantify the seismic hazards, the exposed assets and their seismic fragilities much more accurately than currently possible. Only together these combined measures may first help to quantify and then reduce our currently untenably large seismic risk exposures in the virtually unprepared eastern cities. Given the low-probability/high-impact situation in this part of the country, seismic safety planning needs to be woven into both the regular capital spending and daily operational procedures. Without it we must be prepared to see little progress. Unless we succeed to build seismic safety considerations into everyday decision making as a normal procedure of doing business, society will lose the race against the unstoppable forces of nature. While we never can entirely win this race, we can succeed in converting unmitigated catastrophes into manageable disasters, or better, tolerable natural events.

How the Antichrist Will Undermine Trump's Plan

Trump’s Ban Could Kneecap the ISIS War

President Trump’s ban targeting certain Muslim-majority countries is supposed to make the U.S. safer, but in doing so he may have guaranteed defeating ISIS will get harder.

Kimberly Dozier

01.29.17 1:38 PM ET

Team Trump’s travel ban, or pause, or whatever reverse politically correct term you want to call it, has sparked simmering fury among America’s Muslim allies. The media splash meant to show that President Donald Trump means business about keeping America safe, and keeping his campaign promises, is ironically damaging the very campaign against terrorism he wants to put into overdrive.

Key allies in the fight against the so-called Islamic State are dumbfounded, but few are making official statements, unwilling to pick a fight with the pugnacious new White House. 

Iraqi parliamentarians have called for similar bans against U.S. citizens, and Iranian-backed militia groups have called for American troops to be ejected from their country. 

But the Iraqi government, managing a fragile and fractious multi-ethnic coalition against ISIS, is treading carefully. Government spokesman Saad al-Hadithi told the AP that Iraqis are hoping the "measures will be temporary and for regulatory reasons and not permanent at least for Iraq."

Other allies? Not so diplomatic.

“This is an insult to us all,” said one Afghan official reached Sunday. “To treat all as terrorists is not what inspires support and confidence among friends.”

Afghanistan is not among the seven nations listed in President Donald Trump’s executive order, but the official said the public response to the order was prompting questions in Kabul about how long the government could allow U.S. troops to remain, without suffering a backlash from its own people.

The order signed Friday suspends travel for 90 days for travelers from seven predominantly Muslim nations deemed to be centers of terrorist activity – Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. The executive order also suspends the entire U.S. refugee program for four months. Trump insists it’s “not a Muslim ban” but he’s also spoken of giving Christian refugees priority, which has been read in the Muslim world as casting them as second-class citizens.

Anger is spreading to the Arab street, reflected in social media and newspaper articles – the kind of RAGE that fueled the Arab Spring revolt against Mideast dictators – therefore, the kind Muslim leaders take very seriously.

Like the Afghan official, others say that if this sentiment builds, it will make it harder to cooperate publicly with the U.S. on counterterrorist issues, and harder still to host U.S. troops on their soil.

The various officials who spoke to The Daily Beast say they understand the implementation had to be a surprise, so as not to spark a rush for the U.S. border ahead of an announced deadline. But the haphazard execution at U.S. border entry points, and the lack of briefings even after the order was signed have made it harder for them to defend America’s actions back home.

 “We read about it in leaks to the media, and kept waiting for State Department officials to brief us, but the calls never came,” said a senior Mideast diplomat who didn’t know what to tell his government when the news broke.

That may be because most State Department officials were blindsided too, according to multiple persons familiar with the matter. U.S. diplomats in Baghdad complained the ban would keep a top Iraqi general in the ISIS fight from visiting family in the U.S., stop General Electric from hosting Iraqi delegates in the U.S. as part of a $2 billion energy deal, and send the wrong signal to some 62,000 applicants being considered for relocation for aiding the U.S. during the war. That was among the possible fallout of the new policy, listed in a letter obtained by The Wall Street Journal, sent Saturday from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to the State Department.

A State Department spokesman declined to comment on the letter, but said they remain “in close contact with our coalition partners on a range of issues,” in the quest to defeat ISIS.

Already, Iraqi militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr called on all American citizens to leave Iraq. Sadr’s group killed hundreds of U.S. troops during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, but has held its fire during the ISIS fight, as it technically answers to the Iraqi prime minister, under the umbrella of the 140,000-strong Popular Mobilization Forces. General Stephen Townsend, who commands the coalition effort in Iraq, told The Daily Beast in December that PMF forces were behaving mostly lawfully and not attacking U.S. troops. The U.S. even intercepted some communications from some members asking their leadership for permission to attack the Americans – and being told to stand down.

But that was before the Trump White House delivered what is being taken as an insult to Muslim pride – seeming to apply suspicion to all, in the same vein as National Security Adviser Michael Flynn’s tweet that “Fear of Muslims is rational.” 

So far, the mission against ISIS has been going as planned. 

“We remain focused on killing the bad guys,” with strikes, training, surveillance and intelligence support to the Iraqis and other local forces continuing, said a U.S. military official who is part of the fight. “All those missions continue with no disruption.”

But it's unclear to U.S. military officials what sort of knock-on effect this will have on programs that bring Iraqi officers or politicians to the states for short term courses or high-level meetings – the kind of effects the U.S. embassy warned of in its letter.

 “We gotta let the rules play out and determine what the impact is,” the officials said.

Why Australia is a Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7:7) Australian Uranium Mining Sites Australian Uranium Mining Sites

 

Australian uranium industry plays a role in global production growth
Australian Mining

Australia’s Four Mile uranium mine in South Australia, a joint venture between Quasar Resources and Alliance Resources, is playing a part in a global lift in production of the mineral.

Global uranium production is expected to increase at a compound annual growth rate of 4.3 per cent, to reach 76,493 tonnes in 2020, research and consulting firm GlobalData revealed.

The company’s latest report states that growth in production is needed to meet upcoming demand from new reactors. It outlined that output at Four Mile increased from 750t in 2014 to 990t in 2015.

There are 22 new reactors scheduled for completion in 2017, with a total capacity of 22,444 megawatts (MW), according to GlobalData.

This includes eight reactors in China with a combined capacity of 8510 MW, two reactors in South Korea with a combined capacity of 2680 MW, two reactors in Russia with a combined capacity of 2199 MW, and four reactors in Japan with a combined capacity of 3598 MW.

Global uranium consumption is forecast to increase by five per cent, to reach 88,500t of triuranium octoxide (U₃O₈) in 2017.

The major expansions to nuclear capacity are projected to occur in China, India, Russia and South Korea over the next two years to 2018. The United States is forecast to remain the largest producer of nuclear power in the short term, with the recent completion of the 1200 MW Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor in Tennessee.

Cliff Smee, GlobalData’s head of research and analysis for mining, said: “Commercial operations at the Cigar Lake project in Canada commenced in 2014, with an annual uranium metal capacity of 6900t.

“The project produced 4340t of uranium in 2015, compared with 130t in 2014. Meanwhile, production at the Four Mile project in Australia rose from 750t in 2014 to 990t in 2015.

“By contrast, production from the US declined by 32 per cent in 2015, while in Namibia it decreased by 20 per cent. This was due to respective declines of 33 per cent each at the Smith Ranch-Highland and Crow Butte mines in the US, and falls of 20 per cent and 13.6 per cent at the Rossing and Langer Heinrich mines in Namibia.”

Before the First Nuclear War (Revelation 8)

Why the World Needs to Watch the India-Pakistan Nuclear Standoff

Michael Krepon
January 29, 2017

Nuclear dangers are growing in five different regions. The least noticed is South Asia. New Delhi has not been able to figure out how to deal with militant groups that enjoy safe havens in Pakistan. So far, India’s options have been to do nothing after attacks or execute war plans that invite mushroom clouds. A third option, which involves commando raids, may now be coming into view.

During seven decades of strained relations, Indian war planning has been downsized from fighting major conflicts to fighting limited conventional wars. Comparatively speaking, moving from limited conventional war to commando raids is a step in the right direction. But this progression offers little consolation when the potential for escalation is ever present, and when nuclear weapons serve as a backdrop to every military encounter.

India’s classic war plan against Pakistan centered on large-scale, time-consuming mobilizations along two main fighting corridors. This plan didn’t help India after the “Twin Peaks” crisis, sparked by a brazen attack on the Indian parliament in 2001. India carried out a massive mobilization, but Pakistan’s army deployed faster after a delayed start, which made the prospect of a full-scale conventional war under the shadow of nuclear weapons a poor choice for New Delhi.

War plans don’t go away; they evolve. India’s army then pivoted to plans for quick strikes and shallow advances along many possible avenues of attack. Rawalpindi countered by embracing nuclear weapons tailored for various kinds of battlefield use. The Indian Army’s so-called “Cold Start” doctrine remains on the books, even though implementation is problematic due to long-standing disconnects in civil-military relations, joint-military operations and military procurement. More importantly, a limited conventional war, no matter how carefully planned, may not stay limited. India’s civilian leaders have yet to endorse the army’s plans, and didn’t employ them after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Since then, Pakistan has been more victimized by acts of terror than India. But because the perpetrators are overwhelmingly homegrown—and since they have refrained from attacking Indian targets—their carnage does not prompt war scares on the subcontinent.

In contrast, attacks against Indian targets that originate in Pakistan have clear escalatory potential. They typically occur after New Delhi makes overtures to improve relations with Pakistan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made three such overtures. He invited Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his inauguration in May 2014, he agreed in July 2015 to resume a composite dialogue on all outstanding issues, and he made an unannounced visit to Lahore bearing birthday and wedding gifts for Nawaz Sharif and his family on Christmas Day 2015.

Attacks on Indian military camps or consulates in Afghanistan followed after each of these overtures. After the attack on the Indian military outpost at Uri last September, Modi dispensed with diplomacy and adopted a very hard line. The announcement of “surgical strikes” across the Kashmir divide followed, and were reinforced by pointed references to Pakistan’s jugular—stirring up greater disaffection in Baluchistan and revisiting the Indus Waters Treaty.

Relations between India and Pakistan are now stuck in a bad place and have poor prospects of improvement in the near term. Bilateral diplomacy is limping along, the Kashmir Valley is seething due to ham-fisted governance and a lockdown by Indian security forces, and artillery fire can again be heard across the Kashmir divide.

Rawalpindi’s military’s campaign against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan will probably never end. But now that it is winding down, Pakistan is being asked what the next step in counterterrorism operations might be. So far, there has been no answer. Taking aim at the Afghan Taliban leadership and the Haqqani network seems unlikely, because ceding influence in Kabul to India is not in the cards. Tackling anti-India and violence-prone sectarian groups also seems problematic because doing so would result in a more intrusive military presence and significant spikes of violence—especially in the Punjab. To turn against anti-India groups when Modi has adopted a hard line and when Kashmiris are deeply disaffected doesn’t seem likely. Consequently, much is now left to chance—particularly additional attacks on Indian military and diplomatic outposts.

Domestic politics and shrill social and television media militate against hesitant Indian reactions, even to low-level attacks by groups enjoying safe havens in Pakistan. Hotheads don’t care that attacks against Indian targets have hurt Pakistan’s regional and international standing; nor do they care whether or not India retaliates. New Delhi expects support—or at least silence—if it decides to strike back.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s diplomacy is hamstrung. The talking point that Pakistan does not distinguish between “good” and “bad” terrorists is belied by facts on the ground. Calls for a resumption of dialogue and a focus on conflict resolution do not resonate because “bad” terrorists that enjoy safe havens stymie both. Until it takes very hard, demonstrable steps against these groups, Pakistan cannot expect a fair hearing about its legitimate grievances.

Michael Krepon is Co-founder of the Stimson Center. His latest edited volume is The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age.

Image: Pakistani Shaheen-I ballistic missile. Pixabay

Indian Point Controversy Before the Sixth Seal (Revelation 6)

Indian Point closure plan sparks a nuclear reaction

Crains

Gov. Andrew Cuomo's Clean Energy Standard is an investment in our clean-energy future. To suggest the CES is a bailout for the state's nuclear plants fails to recognize the great value they provide ("Better alternatives to Cuomo's nuclear-plant bailout," Jan. 9).

The benefits, especially the nuclear component, help the state achieve its clean-air objectives while minimizing costs compared to alternatives. Opponents incorrectly claim the zero-emission credits program is a tax and will increase electricity bills. This could not be further from the truth. A Brattle Group report found it will save consumers $1 billion a year, or $12 billion by 2030, compared with replacing upstate nuclear plants immediately with 100% renewable energy.

The notion that we can just replace them with renewable power is misguided and would mean the 15% loss of the state's electricity supply, raising electricity prices more than the cost of zero-emission credits.

New York's upstate nuclear facilities supply thousands of jobs to highly skilled workers and stimulate upstate economies, supporting businesses and schools. Preserving nuclear plants will help New York remain a leader in carbon reduction while retaining well-paying jobs and keeping energy prices low. That is something we should all support.

TED SKERPON

Syracuse
The writer is business manager of IBEW Local 97, which represents 4,700 power-industry workers in New York.

A version of this article appears in the January 30, 2017, print issue of Crain's New York Business.

Antichrist wants Americans out over Trump's ban on Muslims

Top Iraqi cleric wants Americans out over Trump's ban on Muslims

Press TV

Prominent Iraqi cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, has censured US President Donald Trump over his executive order to ban entry into the US of citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries, calling for the expulsion of American nationals from the Arab country in retaliation.

“It would be arrogance for you to enter freely Iraq and other countries while barring them the entrance to your country ... and therefore you should get your nationals out,” Sadr said in a statement published on his website on Sunday.

Iraqi parl. says govt. must reciprocate US travel ban

Meanwhile, Iraqi parliament's foreign affairs committee has decried the measure as “unfair,” and asked the Iraqi government to “reciprocate” the travel curbs imposed on Iraqis.

“We ask the Iraqi government to reciprocate ... the decision taken by the US administration,” the committee said in a statement, adding, “Iraq is in the frontline of the war of terrorism ... and it is unfair that the Iraqis are treated in this way.”

"We clearly demanded that the Iraqi government deal reciprocally in all issues... with the United States of America," Hassan Shwairid, the deputy head of the committee, told AFP.

On January 27, Trump signed a sweeping executive order to make good on his promised Muslim Ban.

The new Republican president’s order imposes a 90-day ban on the entry of citizens of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Somalia, blocks refugees from Syria indefinitely, and suspends all refugee admissions for 120 days.

Iraq's popular forces want Americans out

In a related development, the pro-government Popular Mobilization Forces, commonly known by the Arabic word Hashd al-Sha’abi, also urged Iraqi authorities to bar the entrance of Americans into the country.

“After the decision of the American president to prohibit the entry of Iraqi citizens to the United States of America, we demand Americans be prevented from entering Iraq, and the removal of those of them who are present,” Hashd al-Sha’abi said in a statement.

The statement did not clarify whether the demand applies to the US military personnel already deployed to Iraq or not.

Thousands of American troops are currently in Iraq as part of the so-called US-led coalition against Daesh Takfiri terrorist group.

Hashd al-Sha’abi fighters joined forces with Iraqi army soldiers and Kurdish Peshmerga forces in a major operation on October 17, 2016 to retake the strategic northern city of Mosul from Daesh extremists.

The pro-government fighters also played a major role in the liberation of Tikrit, located 140 kilometers northwest of the capital, Baghdad, as well as Fallujah city in the western province of al-Anbar among many areas in Iraq.

The reactions to Trump's Muslim ban come amid reports that the Iraqi government plans to lobby the US administration to mitigate the impact of restrictions on Iraqi travelers and preserve cooperation in the anti-Daesh campaign.

On Saturday, protests broke out at major US airports, including Dallas, Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles and New York, after border agents began detaining refugees and immigrants arriving in the country.

Families anxiously waited to learn the fate of their loved ones at terminals, while protesters chanted "Let them in" and "This is What America Looks Like."

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also filed a lawsuit, challenging Trump’s executive order on behalf of two Iraqis who were detained at New York’s John F. Kennedy airport on Friday.

ACLU lawyers successfully argued for a temporary stay, allowing the detained travelers to stay in the country.

Cuomo's Nuclear Disaster Comes At The Sixth Seal (Rev 6:12)

Andrew Cuomo’s coming nuclear disaster

By Christine Todd Whitman

December 7, 2015 | 8:41pm  

Indian Point nuclear power plant. Photo: AP

While negotiators in Paris were hammering out a new agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, New York state announced a plan to reduce its carbon emissions 40 percent by 2030. And yet the state is, at the same time, making it virtually impossible to do so.

Any energy plan that clearly recognizes the role nuclear energy has in reducing dangerous emissions should be welcomed by all New Yorkers — and would be if it wasn’t clear that the state is picking and choosing which nuclear-power facilities should stay open at the expense of taxpayers, especially those in New York City.

The new plan to transition the state to a lower-carbon-energy portfolio includes developing a process to prevent the premature closure of nuclear plants upstate.

While it comes too late to save Entergy Corp.’s FitzPatrick plant in Oswego — slated to close within two years — the plan appears to be designed to throw a lifeline to another upstate facility: the Ginna nuclear power plant in the upstate town of Ontario.

This fall, owner Exelon and grid operator Rochester Gas & Electric worked out an agreement that will keep Ginna operating through March 2017. Beyond that, the plant’s fate remains uncertain due to economic pressures caused by an electricity market flooded with low-cost natural gas.

The troubling contradiction is that the state is also taking action to shut down Indian Point Energy Center in Buchanan, the single best tool New York City has to help meet carbon-reduction goals.

As the state has recognized, nuclear energy not only supports the state’s emission goals, but also keeps electricity bills low and stable for citizens. However, on Nov. 16, the state asked the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to deny the relicensing of Indian Point.

As the former administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency and governor of New Jersey, I find this request unsettling at best.

For decades, nuclear energy has safely served as the backbone of the Northeast’s carbon-free energy supply. In fact, Indian Point alone generates 25 percent of New York City’s electricity and 10 percent of the electricity for all New Yorkers. Moreover, the two reactors at Indian Point produce about one-quarter of the state’s carbon-free electricity.

The entire debate around extending the operation of Indian Point becomes even more important when you consider its role in meeting the EPA’s Clean Power Plan.

Under these climate rules, New York must reduce 3.3 million short tons of carbon dioxide by 2030. Removing Indian Point, which prevents the release of 9.3 million short tons of carbon dioxide a year, would make this requirement significantly harder to meet.

To put these numbers in perspective, the amount of carbon dioxide the state would need to reduce, to make up for Indian Point’s closure, is the equivalent of the annual greenhouse-gas emissions of more than 2.4 million passenger cars.

Clean, affordable and reliable — these are the necessary elements for sound energy plans as states like New York look to meet their emissions-reductions requirements under the Clean Power Plan. The one large-scale source of energy that meets these requirements is nuclear energy.

Albany’s plan to mandate renewable-energy sources even recognizes the value of nuclear energy — although the state only seems to see a place for the low rates and reliable power for upstate residents.

New York shouldn’t be picking when and where nuclear energy should be allowed to operate. The state should be supporting all of its clean-energy industry, not standing against it.

We should be working to prevent well-operated, safe and efficient US nuclear energy facilities like Indian Point from shutting down prematurely.

Christine Todd Whitman, former NJ governor and former Environmental Protection Agency administrator, is president of The Whitman Strategy Group and co-chair of the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition.