Donald Trump’s election as president signals a big shift in the political landscape. Many observers have commented on how unpredictable the country’s future course now seems. However, there is at least one thing that will not change over the next four years. Avoiding nuclear war will remain the top priority of the U.S. government, because it is the one danger that can destroy our democracy in a day.
Trump understood this from the beginning of his campaign. He said early on that the U.S. needed to modernize its aging nuclear deterrent, and he returned to that theme over and over again in stump speeches. He was right: maintaining an assured ability to retaliate after a surprise attack is the main reason why potential aggressors don’t attack in the first place. So Washington needs to pick up the pace of nuclear modernization.
However, there is more to averting nuclear holocaust than having a robust strategic force. The U.S. needs to avoid getting into non-nuclear conflicts and crises that could escalate to the nuclear level. Eastern Europe is the place where such a scenario is most likely to unfold, because since the Cold War ended, the U.S. has extended security guarantees to former Soviet republics and satellites that lie close to the Russian heartland.
Avoiding nuclear war isn’t just about having a resilient strategic force. You also need modern ground forces that can deter conventional aggression — the kind of aggression that might escalate to nuclear conflict. (Credit: Wikipedia/National Nuclear Security Administration / Nevada Site Office
For instance, after a NATO summit in July, President Obama reiterated America’s “unwavering commitment” to the security of countries on Russia’s doorstep, proclaiming that “we will defend every ally.” Coming as they did from a president who has reduced U.S. ground forces to a mere two brigades in a region where Moscow enjoys huge military advantages, Obama’s statements were extremely dangerous.
If Russia decided to move on Ukraine or the Baltic states, nuclear weapons might be the only way Washington could avoid quick defeat. NATO strategy envisions such a possibility, which is one reason why Obama’s senior security advisors rebelled against a proposal earlier this year to publicly state the U.S. would never be the first country to use nuclear weapons in a future war. Fact is, NATO strategy assumes it might be.
But because there are no guarantees Washington can get along with Moscow, something else needs to be done to minimize the likelihood a future European conflict will escalate to all-out nuclear war. Washington needs to modernize the conventional warfighting capabilities of U.S. military forces in Europe so Moscow sees little opportunity for quick victory in a future crisis. If Moscow is deterred from launching conventional aggression, there is little danger of a local conflict escalating to unrestrained nuclear war.
U.S. policymakers understood the linkage between conventional strength and nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. They talked about being able to prevail in Europe at each rung on the “ladder of escalation.” Judging from the way the Obama team denuded U.S. ground forces in Europe of warfighting capabilities, it didn’t see the connection. So now, in addition to working on improving relations with Moscow and rebuilding the nation’s nuclear force, the Trump team needs to restore some semblance of conventional deterrence in Europe.
Other than buying the F-35 fighter, which is crucial to defeating Russia’s regional air defenses because it is invisible to radar, this is mainly about upgrading the Army. The U.S. needs more than a “tripwire” defense on the ground, and the forces it fields must make Moscow doubt that a quick victory is possible. It is the illusion of easy success that could lead Russia to launch a military campaign in a future crisis, and thereby lead to nuclear escalation. So the U.S. Army must be able to stop a Russian advance without escalating to nuclear use.
This would not be expensive for a government that spends $11 billion per day. In fact, it could be accomplished by adding a little over one’s day’s worth of federal outlays to the Army’s equipment budget, as long as forces were redeployed to deter aggression more effectively. Basically we’re talking about improving the firepower, survivability and connectivity of combat systems the Army already owns, like the Abrams tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Stryker troop carrier. Accelerated modernization of Army helicopters, improved electronic countermeasures and defenses against Russian drones would also be needed.
These improvements need to be made anyway, because Army modernization accounts have been starved for funding during the Obama years, and enemies are beginning to catch up. Seriously — Americans spend more on beer every three months than the Army gets in a year for new equipment. That needs to be fixed, not just because soldiers will die otherwise, but because having a resilient, robust ground force in Europe is our best insurance against the outbreak of a regional conflict that escalates to nuclear Armageddon during the Trump era.
The Russians know this, and have their own strategy for going nuclear in a future regional conflict. The Russian military’s chief of staff said in 2011 that local conflicts anywhere along his country’s borders could result in use of nuclear weapons, and doctrine has been developed for how Moscow would use nuclear weapons to gain the upper hand in a fight. Problem is, once the weapons of mass destruction start flying, the fight could escalate to an all-out strategic exchange.
If it did, American democracy might not survive. Tens of millions of Americans could die during the first weeks of war. There is little indication President Obama gave any thought to this possibility before extending his ill-advised commitments to countries lying only a few minutes from Russian military bases.
Although President-elect Trump is often derided by critics for not knowing much about geopolitics or strategy, the evidence to date suggests he sees the strategic landscape more clearly than Obama does. Trump understands that when a country has a thousand nuclear weapons aimed at your homeland, you need to work hard to stay on good terms with them. Even if it means conceding they might have legitimate security concerns near their own homeland.
No comments:
Post a Comment