Key reasons behind Iran’s extension of power in Yemen
Friday, 20 May 2016
When a conflict erupts in a state, some countries which are not
bordered with the conflict-affected state use political opportunism to
direct the war in their interest.
Massoud Jazayiri,
deputy head of Iran’s Armed Forces, recently told Iran’s Tasnim news
agency, that Iran is ready to copycat the process it adopted in Syria
and use it in Yemen as well. He added that Iran is prepared to send
“military advisers” in support of the Houthis in Yemen.
Several of Iran’s weapons shipments, which were likely heading to war-torn Yemen, had also been seized.
The statement by the deputy head of Iran’s
Armed Forces, referring to repeating Iran’s role in Yemen, is more of an
exaggerated political posturing than reality.
Iran’s role in the war in Yemen is
multidimensional. On the surface, Yemen does not seem to bear
geopolitical or strategic significance for the Iranian leaders. Yemen’s
conflict also does not pose a national security threat to Iran. But, why
Iran is determined to have a role in Yemen’s war and direct it in its
favor?
The ideological factor
The key decision maker in Iran’s foreign
policy is the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who pursues the
ideology of his predecessor, Ayatollah Rooh Allah Khomenei, the founding
figure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khamenei has shown almost no
deviation from Khomeini’s ideals.
In addition, Khamenei gives weight to the
information he receives from his close advisors in the Office of the
Supreme Leader (not the President, the foreign minister, or other
powerful clerics) and the hardline senior cadre of Iran’s revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC).
Since Khamenei views himself as the leader of Muslims, he has naturally positioned himself to view Saudi Arabia as a competitor and rival
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh
One of Khamenei’s underlying revolutionary
values is that he views himself as the leader of the Islamic world and
he views Iran as the vanguard of Muslims. In fact, his official website
refers to him as the “Supreme Leader of Muslims”, not the Supreme Leader
of “Iran” or solely the “Shiites”.
Other revolutionary ideals include
anti-Americanism. Khamenei regards his rhetoric and projection of Iran’s
increasing role in Yemen’s conflict is a tactic to counter-balance the
US role in the region.
The geopolitical and strategic reasons
Iran considers itself, and desires to be
treated, as the paramount power in the Middle East because of it
strategic significance, geographic location, military capabilities,
economic strength, wealth and natural resources (such as holding the
second and fourth largest gas and oil reserves in the world), and size
of its population (second largest most populous nation in the Middle
East after Egypt).
While Yemen does not pose a national security
threat to Iran, it does to Saudi Arabia since it shares a border with
Riyadh. Iran seizes this opportunity, by supporting the Houthis, to
challenge Saudi Arabia, making it look more vulnerable, all while Tehran
is showing off its regional significance to Saudi Arabia and how it can
cause a security threat to Riyadh.
In addition, by diverting the Saudi’s
attention to Yemen, Iran is attempting to create a quagmire for Riyadh
in Yemen, making it bogged down in Sanaa, in order to draw it away from
Syria and Iraq; Iran’s main allies.
Iran also seizes the opportunity to increase
its leverage against Riyadh and use Yemen as a strategic bargaining
chip, to push Saudi Arabia to change it policy toward Damascus, Baghdad,
Bahrain or other countries where Iran exerts influence.
Economic, ethnic and sectarian factors
Economically speaking, Yemen is not as costly
for Iran as Syria is, but it brings many benefits. Furthermore, Iran’s
strategy of expanding its influence in the region is to create proxies
in Muslim countries and make a political reality out of them to
influence the domestic affairs of those nations (as it has done with
Hezbollah and other Shiite groups in Iraq).
Ethnically speaking, and in terms of
nationalism, Iran views one layer of its competition against Saudi
Arabia as the rivalry between Persians and Arabs. Iran’s influence in
Yemen helps Tehran in this respect.
Finally,
although Iran views itself as the vanguard of both Sunnis and Shiites,
it does contain a covert sectarian agenda in supporting the Shiites (or
an offshoot of Shiism) to improve and extend its influence in other
countries.
______________________
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, an Iranian-American political scientist and Harvard University scholar, is president of the International American Council. Rafizadeh serves on the board of Harvard International Review at Harvard University. He is also a member of the Gulf project at Columbia University. Rafizadeh served as a senior fellow at Nonviolence International Organization based in Washington DC. He has been a recipient of several scholarships and fellowship including from Oxford University, Annenberg University, University of California Santa Barbara, and Fulbright Teaching program. He served as ambassador for the National Iranian-American Council based in Washington DC, conducted research at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and taught at University of California Santa Barbara through Fulbright Teaching Scholarship. He can be reached at Dr.rafizadeh@fas.harvard.edu, @Dr_Rafizadeh.
______________________
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, an Iranian-American political scientist and Harvard University scholar, is president of the International American Council. Rafizadeh serves on the board of Harvard International Review at Harvard University. He is also a member of the Gulf project at Columbia University. Rafizadeh served as a senior fellow at Nonviolence International Organization based in Washington DC. He has been a recipient of several scholarships and fellowship including from Oxford University, Annenberg University, University of California Santa Barbara, and Fulbright Teaching program. He served as ambassador for the National Iranian-American Council based in Washington DC, conducted research at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and taught at University of California Santa Barbara through Fulbright Teaching Scholarship. He can be reached at Dr.rafizadeh@fas.harvard.edu, @Dr_Rafizadeh.
Last Update: Friday, 20 May 2016 KSA 08:58 – GMT 05:58
