Diverse Shiite Militias Highlight Iraq Division
Since the Sunni militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of Mosul last month, Iraq has also seen an increase in clashes between Shiite militias and Iraqi security forces. In an email interview, Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland, discussed the growing threat of Shiite militias in Iraq.
WPR: What are the major Shiite militias in Iraq today, and what differentiates them from one another?
Phillip Smyth: Major Shiite militias in Iraq can be split into a number of different categories and groups. First among them are the Iranian proxy organizations: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, The Badr Organization, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Hizballah and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. There are smaller and newer organizations being created, but they do not have the same presence as these other five groups, which have combat experience in Syria and are reportedly engaged on most of the fronts in Iraq where there has been heavy fighting.
Iranian proxies follow the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih—“absolute guardianship of the jurist”—which calls for their loyalty to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the spreading of the ideology of Islamic revolution established by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Much of their direction comes from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Then there are groups under the control of Muqtada al-Sadr. The newest is called Saraya al-Salaam (The Peace Brigades), whose task was specifically outlined as “shrine protectors.” Their deployments and training leaves much to be desired, and it is my belief they serve as more of a counter to Maliki and Iranian proxies within Iraq. In general, Sadr’s forces have the advantage of being rather numerous, and Sadr has been in control of many Iraqi Shiite areas for years. It remains to be seen how they will be used as the conflict grinds on.
There are also groups that have been extremely influenced by both Sadr and Iran, namely Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas Tashkil al-Iraq (The Abu Fadhl al-Abbas Brigade Iraq Formation). As with Iran’s direct proxies listed above, Iraq’s Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas can call on fighters who have combat experience in Syria.
Maliki and the Iraqi government have also established their own popular committee-style organizations. Often elements from the army or internal security forces have assisted in training these groups, and there have been claims that Iran’s proxies and the IRGC have influenced their training regimens. Maliki’s militia structures appear to be involved in more of a rearguard style of deployment. It also seems that their goals have less to do with the existential threat of “the Islamic State” and more to do with solidifying Maliki’s power, particularly in the context of Sadr’s recent maneuvering.
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which is one of Iraq’s largest Shiite parties and plays more to middle-class interests, also established its own militia called Saraya Ashura (The Ashura Brigades) following Shiite cleric Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani’s fatwa for jihad.
There are also smaller militia groups loyal to local leaders or clerics.
WPR: What are the militias’ specific military capabilities?
Smyth: In terms of specific combat abilities, many of the Iranian proxies have more extensive experience with combined-arms styles of warfare. They have utilized a mixture of infantry and armored forces when in Syria, and it would appear they have also adopted many of those tactics for use in Iraq. Additionally, Iranian proxies have also infiltrated the Iraqi military and have gained experience in those ranks. A number of these fighters also fought American forces in asymmetric combat roles during the 2003 Iraq War, and they are being reintroduced into the current conflict. However, these groups have been engaged in a wide-ranging recruitment effort and have less-experienced personnel. Other groups, particularly Maliki’s popular militia groups, main sections of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salaam and Mahdi Army and smaller organizations have more simplistic basic training, mostly limited to small arms.
WPR: What political and military role could the militias play to check the advance of ISIS?
Smyth: Right now, these militias are being used in offensive and defensive roles against ISIS. Nevertheless, most of the groups have taken on dual roles that include maintaining dominance over areas they control. Some of the groups have limited themselves to engaging ISIS at a distance, sporadically using a mixture of mortars and artillery. In terms of any political pressure they can bring against ISIS, I think we are well past the point where that should be a concern. The new concern should be focused on how these groups will politically influence events in Baghdad and the broader Shiite rump state’s hinterlands.
Sadr’s New Peace Brigades
Since the Sunni militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of Mosul last month, Iraq has also seen an increase in clashes between Shiite militias and Iraqi security forces. In an email interview, Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland, discussed the growing threat of Shiite militias in Iraq.
WPR: What are the major Shiite militias in Iraq today, and what differentiates them from one another?
Phillip Smyth: Major Shiite militias in Iraq can be split into a number of different categories and groups. First among them are the Iranian proxy organizations: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, The Badr Organization, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Hizballah and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. There are smaller and newer organizations being created, but they do not have the same presence as these other five groups, which have combat experience in Syria and are reportedly engaged on most of the fronts in Iraq where there has been heavy fighting.
Iranian proxies follow the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih—“absolute guardianship of the jurist”—which calls for their loyalty to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the spreading of the ideology of Islamic revolution established by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Much of their direction comes from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Then there are groups under the control of Muqtada al-Sadr. The newest is called Saraya al-Salaam (The Peace Brigades), whose task was specifically outlined as “shrine protectors.” Their deployments and training leaves much to be desired, and it is my belief they serve as more of a counter to Maliki and Iranian proxies within Iraq. In general, Sadr’s forces have the advantage of being rather numerous, and Sadr has been in control of many Iraqi Shiite areas for years. It remains to be seen how they will be used as the conflict grinds on.
There are also groups that have been extremely influenced by both Sadr and Iran, namely Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas Tashkil al-Iraq (The Abu Fadhl al-Abbas Brigade Iraq Formation). As with Iran’s direct proxies listed above, Iraq’s Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas can call on fighters who have combat experience in Syria.
Maliki and the Iraqi government have also established their own popular committee-style organizations. Often elements from the army or internal security forces have assisted in training these groups, and there have been claims that Iran’s proxies and the IRGC have influenced their training regimens. Maliki’s militia structures appear to be involved in more of a rearguard style of deployment. It also seems that their goals have less to do with the existential threat of “the Islamic State” and more to do with solidifying Maliki’s power, particularly in the context of Sadr’s recent maneuvering.
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which is one of Iraq’s largest Shiite parties and plays more to middle-class interests, also established its own militia called Saraya Ashura (The Ashura Brigades) following Shiite cleric Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani’s fatwa for jihad.
There are also smaller militia groups loyal to local leaders or clerics.
WPR: What are the militias’ specific military capabilities?
Smyth: In terms of specific combat abilities, many of the Iranian proxies have more extensive experience with combined-arms styles of warfare. They have utilized a mixture of infantry and armored forces when in Syria, and it would appear they have also adopted many of those tactics for use in Iraq. Additionally, Iranian proxies have also infiltrated the Iraqi military and have gained experience in those ranks. A number of these fighters also fought American forces in asymmetric combat roles during the 2003 Iraq War, and they are being reintroduced into the current conflict. However, these groups have been engaged in a wide-ranging recruitment effort and have less-experienced personnel. Other groups, particularly Maliki’s popular militia groups, main sections of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salaam and Mahdi Army and smaller organizations have more simplistic basic training, mostly limited to small arms.
WPR: What political and military role could the militias play to check the advance of ISIS?
Smyth: Right now, these militias are being used in offensive and defensive roles against ISIS. Nevertheless, most of the groups have taken on dual roles that include maintaining dominance over areas they control. Some of the groups have limited themselves to engaging ISIS at a distance, sporadically using a mixture of mortars and artillery. In terms of any political pressure they can bring against ISIS, I think we are well past the point where that should be a concern. The new concern should be focused on how these groups will politically influence events in Baghdad and the broader Shiite rump state’s hinterlands.
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