Antichrist Protests Against Al-Maliki

Iraq: Sectarianism, Oil and the War in Syria (Part 1/2)

17 March 2014
Manuel Langendorf

Maliki treats the breakdown of order in Iraq as a challenge to his rule.
Iraq has certainly experienced a turbulent decade. The US-led invasion in 2003 which culminated in the ouster of long-time ruler Saddam Hussein was a game-changer in Iraq's history. Subsequent efforts by the Coalition Provisional Authority, under the leadership of Ambassador Paul Bremer, led to the dismantling of key institutions of the Ba'athist power structure on which Hussein relied, including the Iraqi army.
In 2005, a new constitution — which many argue is flawed — was approved, establishing the Republic of Iraq as a "single federal, independent and fully sovereign state" with Islam as its official religion.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki rose to power in 2006 and is serving his second term in office.
Al-Maliki's premiership is far from uncontested, especially as Iraqi Sunnis have accused him of discrimination and favoritism toward the Shi'a community, which the prime minister himself is a part of. Antigovernment protests that began in late 2012, predominantly by but not only limited to the disenfranchised Sunni community, turned violent last year. In 2013, Iraq witnessed its most violent period in over five years with a significant increase in inter-communal conflict.
Experts and different players in Iraq are divided over what caused this flare-up in violence. In April 2013, al-Maliki stated that sectarian conflict had returned to Iraq "because it began in another place" of the region. His statement was seen as a reference to the civil war in Syria, which is about to enter its fourth year.
Iraq, a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has large oil reserves which are unevenly spread across the country. As of January 2013, it also held the 12^th largest natural gas reserves in the world, with over 60% being located in southern Iraq.
Situated along some of the region's key fault lines, Iraq's future is likely to determine some of the wider issues and conflicts in the Middle East.
Fair Observer's Middle East Editor, Manuel Langendorf, speaks to Chris Zambelis, a senior analyst specializing in Middle East affairs for the risk management group Helios Global. Langendorf and Zambelis talk about the causes of violence in Iraq, the players involved, and the country's potential in the world energy market.
Manuel Langendorf: While international media attention is mainly directed at the situation in Syria, Iraq has witnessed some of the bloodiest months in its recent history with anti-government protests, a resurgence of suicide bombings, and a general increase in inter-communal conflict. What is behind this flare-up in violence? Earlier this year, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki argued that sectarian violence had returned to Iraq due to a spillover effect from Syria. Is this the reason?
Chris Zambelis: The reasons for the notable upsurge of violence in Iraq are manifold and are based on internal Iraqi and regional geopolitical factors. According to most authoritative estimates, in 2013 Iraq experienced its worst bout of protracted violence since 2008. Based on the latest indicators, 2014 portends to be as bad if not worse than 2013. We have to consider the numerous domestic social, political and economic factors behind the violence.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who heads the Shi'a-led Islamic Dawa Party and the political parties and independents that make up the Shi'a-led State of Law Coalition, has engendered widespread opposition among a large segment of Iraq's Sunni Arab population. This reality is best demonstrated by the actions of those residing in Anbar Province and other parts of western Iraq.
Many Sunni Arabs feel marginalized by what they see as a campaign led by al-Maliki and his Shi'a allies to permanently undermine their influence in Iraq. While having to endure the authoritarianism of the previous Ba'athist order just like all Iraqis, Sunni Arabs tended to dominate the old institutions such as the public sector and security services, while Shi'a Arabs and Kurds, among others, faced widespread persecution.
The tide has now turned: Shi'a Arabs, who constitute the majority of Iraq's population, have come to dominate post-Ba'athist Iraqi society. The arrests of many high-profile Sunni Arab political, religious and tribal figures opposed to al-Maliki, including individuals associated with the previous Ba'athist order and various Sunni Islamist movements, have also inflamed tensions. The resort to violent crackdowns against public demonstrations by Sunni Arabs, who continue to agitate against Baghdad in places such as al-Fallujah and al-Ramadi in Anbar Province, has likewise raised the political temperature.
The Iraqi prime minister is also seen as having abandoned any attempt to engender support beyond his core Shi'a Arab demographic base in favor of an agenda characterized by sectarianism and revenge. Many Sunni Arabs view the Iraqi security forces as personal instruments of al-Maliki and his allies, essentially extensions of the many Shi'a militias that emerged across Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
This community also perceives al-Maliki as having no regard for their grievances and concerns. These are valid concerns considering al-Maliki's penchant for attributing expressions of dissent and political organization by Sunni Arabs to Ba'athist or radical Islamist militancy. It is against this backdrop that we have seen calls by numerous factions for autonomy and even the outright independence of Anbar Province (and other regions of Iraq).
Furthermore, it is important to remember that Iraq is scheduled to hold national elections for the Council of Representatives in April. There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding the upcoming elections and al-Maliki's aspirations.
In January 2013, Iraqi lawmakers voted to bar al-Maliki from contesting a third term in office, by instituting a provision on term limits on those serving in senior government posts. Yet a decision by Iraq's Supreme Court in August in that same year overruled the law on term limits, enabling al-Maliki to seek a third term. Not surprisingly, al-Maliki has come to be viewed as being increasingly autocratic and corrupt.
To add another layer of complexity to the situation in question, a notable segment of Shi'a Arabs, particularly those loyal to the influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, have likewise taken to the streets in a show of force against al-Maliki. Some members of al-Maliki's own political coalition have also criticized his actions in recent years.