His was one of the most feared names during Iraq’s
most violent years. But more and more, Muqtada al-Sadr seems to be
treading a path of political expediency. The question is why?
Just a few short years ago, the followers of young Shiite
Muslim cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, were out on the streets kidnapping and
killing their Sunni Muslim countrymen, embroiled in sectarian violence
that virtually dragged Iraq into civil war. But late in 2012, al-Sadr,
who is often described as a “firebrand cleric” in the Western media, was
seen in a rather unusual place: attending prayers behind a Sunni Muslim
religious leader at the Abdul Qader Al Kilani mosque in central
Baghdad.
The unified prayer meeting – unusual in bringing the
sectarian foes together – was the culmination of a series of interesting
moves by al-Sadr, where he had been openly supporting Sunni Muslims
protesting against the current Iraqi government. That government is
headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the bloc that al-Sadr
heads, the Sadrist bloc, is one of its main supporters.
No wonder then, that some were confused. Was this a whole
new al-Sadr? A different and more politically expedient man, than the
one who was once exhorted his followers to kill?
Certainly, al-Sadr has sent out many confusing messages of
late. When the major opposition Iraqiya bloc, led by former Prime
Minister Ayed Allawi, announced its intention to withdraw from the Iraqi
government, al-Sadr first signalled that his group would join them in
trying to end the current Prime Minister’s term prematurely. But when
the time actually came for action, al-Sadr resisted joining the mostly
Sunni Muslim Iraqiya bloc in withdrawing support.
In a statement issued by his office in Najaf, al-Sadr said
that he was against the withdrawal from government because it would be
detrimental to the interests of the Iraqi people. And it was yet another
example of how al-Sadr keeps taking one step toward isolating al-Maliki
and curtailing his power, but then, at the last moment, taking two
steps back.
Our bloc could oust the government led by al-Maliki within
a week, boasts Hakim al-Zamili, a leading member of the Sadrists. “We
made him a prime minister,” he argues. “But we wanted to prevent the
country from further political and security turmoil. So we couldn’t take
any step that would have caused more suffering for the Iraqi people,”
he explains.
“The stream’s position is clear in regard to the
protests,” al-Zamili said. “The most important part of that position is
that we oppose any calls for an end to the current political process. We
also oppose those who are supported from outside of Iraq. We’re against
the sectarian discourse. And we will criticize the government when it
delays in dealing with injustice and when it does not meet the
legitimate constitutional demands of the Iraqi people.”
In fact, the Sadrists are this confident because their
party is founded on an ideological and religious basis, rather than a
strictly political platform. This guarantees them a certain guaranteed
level of popularity among Shiite Muslims. It also allows al-Sadr more
flexibility and pragmatism, letting him adopt tactics that annoy and
confound both his enemies and his allies. It allows him to bring
pressure to bear from various sides.
The difference in the way that al-Maliki and his allies
dealt with the growing Sunni Muslim protests in the western province of
Anbar and the way that al-Sadr was able to deal with them, demonstrates
this.
For example, in February he sent a delegation to meet
ranking Sunni Muslim cleric, Abdul-Malik al-Saadi, who had returned from
Jordan to support the protestors and who was a figurehead for them.
Besides sending a delegation to meet al-Saadi, al-Sadr also expressed
his solidarity with the Sunni Muslim cleric in regard to his
anti-sectarian stance.
Meanwhile al-Maliki and his allies were slow in reacting
to the protests, playing for time. Whereas al-Sadr seemed to spare no
effort in trying to find acceptable solutions that would see protestors
return home.
So is this a new al-Sadr? Has the former “firebrand cleric” matured politically and worked out how to play the game?
Foreign Policy magazine
answered that question recently: “On the one hand, Sadr’s new tune
could reflect his genuine maturation and a newfound desire to play a
positive role in Iraq’s dysfunctional political system; on the other
hand, it could be just a new tactic to expand his influence and power.
Either way, the more Sadr can convince Iraqis - disenfranchised Shia,
Kurds, and Sunnis alike - that he is a reliable and moderate partner,
the more power he will accrue at the expense of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki, also a Shiite.”
“The key for Iraqis,” the magazine carefully concluded,
“is to vet the new Sadr carefully and insist that he backs his sweetened
rhetoric with concrete actions.”
